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PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE ELITE 
"NON-AGENCY'" 
KIMBERLY N. BROWN" 
This Article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a 
new form of independent agency-in effect, a "non-agency" agency 
residing in the no-man's-land between Articles I and II of the 
Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or 
"Board") and endowed it with massive governmental powers while 
insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency, 
rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered 
Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the 
embattled Securities and Exchange Commission-not the 
President-the power to appoint and remove Board members. In 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 
the statute was challenged as violating the Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution and principles of separation of powers. The D. C. 
Circuit upheld the statute, with the dissenting judge calling it "the 
most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President's 
appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 
years." The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. This Article 
considers the legal and normative implications of the PCAOB 
blueprint for future independent agencies, and explores the 
underlying constitutional tension between Congress's power to 
restrict and channel agency administration and the President's 
power to control it. It suggests that the prevailing analytic 
framework for evaluating challenges to novel agency forms is 
problematic, as it reflects a myopic emphasis on presidential power 
per se. This Article posits that a more justiciable "checks-and-
balances" standard may be fashioned by considering whether 
sufficient checks operate to cabin a suspect independent agency's 
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actions without delving into thorny questions about the proper 
scope and definition of executive power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the framers of the Constitution consciously established 
a national government comprised of separated powers, the modern 
administrative state is dotted with numerous "independent" agencies, 
which have been aptly characterized as "strange amalgam[s] of 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, combining functions of all 
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three branches yet the creature[s] of none."! There is a long list of 
them. It includes such powerful regulators as the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations 
Board. The constitutionality of independent agencies has been well 
established since 1935, when the Supreme Court decided, in 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,2 that Congress can place 
limitations on the President's authority to remove independent 
agency appointees.3 A primary justification for the nearly ubiquitous 
tolerance of independent agencies4 is that the power to appoint 
members remains the President's, and that power implicates a 
corollary, though limited, power to remove.5 But in modern times, 
Congress has not been content with confining its hybrid creations to 
the structural contours previously blessed by the Supreme Court.6 As 
a consequence, it has pushed the mechanisms for ensuring the 
accountability of such public entities close to the constitutional 
breaking point.7 
The case in point is the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (the "PCAOB" or "Board"), which Congress created in the 
aftermath of numerous accounting scandals following the implosion 
of Enron and WorldCom.8 Congress endowed the PCAOB with 
significant governmental authority to carry out its raison d'hre: 
auditing the auditors of public companies subject to federal securities 
laws. The Board promulgates rules; inspects and investigates firms for 
violations of federal securities laws; and imposes censures, 
suspensions, and monetary fines. 9 The Board has subpoena authority, 
official immunity from liability, and privileges from third party 
discovery.lO But to Congress, it is not a federal agencyY 
1. Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 41,41. 
2. 295 V.S. 602 (1935). 
3. Id. at 625-26, 632. 
4. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-oj-Powers 
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488,490 (1987). 
5. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 102 (5th ed. 2009). 
6. See infra Part LB. 
7. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and 
Its PublidPrivate Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977-78 (2005) (discussing 15 
V.S.c. §§ 7211-7219 (2000»; see also infra Part I.B (same). 
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750-53 
(codified at 15 V.S.c. § 7211 (2006» (establishing the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"»; see also infra Part LB (discussing the PCAOB). 
9. 15 V.S.c. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2006); see also infra Part I.B. (discussing the 
establishment and powers of the PCAOB). 
10. § 7215. 
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The statute creating the PCAOB takes extraordinary steps 
toward insulating it from traditional means of accountability, and in 
doing so, puts great pressure on separation-of-powers norms. Most 
significantly, it places the power to appoint and remove Board 
members in the hands of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC")-itself an independent agency-and not the PresidentY The 
Board sets its own budget13 and is exempt from the procedural and 
judicial review strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act 
("APA,,).14 In what the dissenting judge called "the most important 
separation-of-powers case regarding the President's appointment and 
removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years,,,15 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute establishing the PCAOB, and the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari.16 
The PCAOB has ignited constitutional controversy because it 
represents a new template for agencies that are not really agencies in 
the traditional sense. The Board is, to coin a phrase, a "non-agency" 
agency residing in the no-man's-land between Article I and Article II 
of the Constitution. 
Although Congress will, no doubt, continue to mint new public 
entities with structural independence as it works to address twenty-
first century problems, the political appetite for novel forms of 
"independent" regulators may well change. The ongoing recession 
and the regulatory failures leading up to gargantuan economic 
declines have prompted cries for agency reformY The very entity 
11. § 7211 ("The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States 
Government .... "). 
12. 15 U.S.C §§ 7211(e)(I)-(5), 7217 (2006) ("The [Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC")] shall have oversight and enforcement authority over the Board 
.... "). 
13. § 7211(c)(7). 
14. § 7211(b) (declaring PCAOB "not ... an agency"); 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559 (2006) 
(applying the Administrative Procedure Act to any "agency"). 
15. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C 
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 
(2009). 
16. Id. As Peter Strauss observes, the Supreme Court may well dodge the 
constitutional questions and resolve the case on other grounds. Peter L. Strauss, Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 V AND L. REV. EN 
BANe 51, 58 (2009), http://ssrn.comlabstract=1442879 (suggesting that questions of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, finality, or statutory construction might render the 
constitutional questions unripe). 
17. See generally Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structund Finance and 
Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era,S HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009) (discussing 
causes of the financial crisis and the need for regulatory reform). 
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responsible for overseeing the PCAOB-the SEC-is charged with 
inexplicably failing to protect investors from staggering financial 
losses caused by a Ponzi scheme of historic proportions.18 The White 
House recently proposed the establishment of a new agency to 
protect the public from harmful financial products.19 The 
constitutionality of novel "non-agency" agencies with dubious lines of 
accountability thus looms large. 
This Article considers some of the legal and normative 
implications of the PCAOB blueprint. Such implications are legion.20 
Who is accountable if the Board abuses its power? If the President 
has no power to appoint or remove members, does the Board's 
exercise of authority violate the Appointments Clause or the 
separation of powers more generally? To what extent is an entity like 
the PCAOB accountable for its actions through judicial review? Is it 
possible to challenge the PCAOB without disturbing the viability of 
any independent agency that departs from a Cabinet-level structure 
characterized by unfettered presidential removal power? This Article 
explores, in particular, the underlying constitutional tension between 
Congress's power to restrict and channel agency administration and 
the President's power to control it. 
Courts are currently ill-equipped to address these questions. 
Prevailing Supreme Court precedent leaves them without a single 
guiding principle or analytic framework for resolving questions 
18. See Steven Pearlstein, SEC's Gapinf( Blind Spots Kept Madoff's Misdeeds out of 
Sif(ht, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A14 (describing the impending inspector general 
report as likely to be a "devastating rebuke" of the SEC's "Madoff screwup"); Aaron 
Pressman, Madoff Whistleblower Markopolos Blasts SEC, Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 8, 
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jun2009/pi2009065_888396.htm 
(describing a push for dramatic changes at the SEC after the $65 billion dollar Madoff 
Ponzi scheme was uncovered as the "biggest fraud in U.S. investing history"); see also U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER 
BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME (2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (detailing the SEC's failures in 
uncovering the Madoff scheme). 
19. David Cho & Michael D. Shear, Obama Presents Bill to Create Consumer-Finance 
Watchdog: New Agency's Scope Draws Stiff Industry Resistance, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, 
at A14 (discussing President Obama's proposal for establishment of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency); Posting of Kimberly Palmer to Alpha Consumer, 
http://www.usnews.comlblogs/alpha-consumer/2009/06/17 /the-debate-over -obamas-new-
consumer-agency-.html (June 17, 2009) (same). 
20. See, e.g., Michael A. Carvin et aI., Practitioner Note, Massive, Unchecked Power 
by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 199,200 (2007) (arguing that Congress 
violated fundamental constitutional principles in creating the PCAOB); Nagy, supra note 
7, at 1031-32 (exploring whether the PCAOB is a state actor governed by the 
Constitution). 
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surrounding the propriety of limits on the President's power to 
appoint and remove independent agency officials.21 In effect, the sky 
is virtually the limit when it comes to new legislative configurations 
for independent agencies. So long as Congress does not retain any 
appointment or removal power for itself, it is largely free to insulate 
agencies from effective presidential oversight if the officers of such 
agencies are structurally subordinate to someone else.22 
This Article proceeds from the premise that some constraints on 
Congress's ability to create new forms of independent agencies are 
appropriate. If Congress and the Supreme Court are to continue 
down the path of creating and endorsing structural novelties with 
substantial governmental powers, they should first have in mind some 
notion of where the outermost constitutional boundary for such 
entities lies.23 The prevailing standard for evaluating the 
constitutionality of infringements on the President's appointment and 
removal powers-the so-called "core functions" test24-is of limited 
utility when it comes to novel entities like the PCAOB. This is partly 
because, in crafting the test for this purpose in Morrison v. Olson,25 
the Supreme Court failed to grapple with a key underlying question: 
the meaning of executive power per se. Yet the scope of such 
power-in particular, whether it encompasses the ability to dictate 
the day-to-day exercise of agency officials' discretion-is hotly 
debated.26 
This Article posits that it is possible to fashion a justiciable 
standard for review of the constitutionality of novel agency structures 
without arriving at a requisite definition of "executive power." 
Encroachments on the President's removal power may be analyzed 
by considering the balance of power between the three branches 
rather than by looking at presidential power in isolation. If Congress 
delegates lawmaking and enforcement authority to an agency, it 
should include some minimally sufficient accountability controls if 
legislation is to survive checks-and-balances scrutiny. Such a "checks-
and-balances" analysis would enable courts to move beyond the 
stagnancy of Morrison without undermining the central viability of 
the independent agency model. 
21. See infra Part II (discussing the problems with the prevailing "core functions" test, 
such as the questions surrounding the foundational definition of executive power). 
22. See infra Part Il.B.2-3. 
23. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 491. 
24. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687--89 (1988). 
25. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
26. See infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text (discussing the debate). 
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Part I reviews the legal framework justifying the existence of 
independent agencies. It then briefly summarizes the competing D.C. 
Circuit opinions,27 which analyze the propriety of the latest blueprint 
for the independent agency: the PCAOB. 
Part II discusses the fundamental dilemma that remains after 
Morrison: how does one know when Congress has gone too far in 
constraining the President's power to appoint and remove officers of 
independent agencies?28 It analyzes the prevailing approaches to the 
problem and identifies a critical fault line: a singular focus on the 
undefined concept of executive power per se. Because this emphasis 
begs a virtually unanswerable question, a fresh perspective is 
warranted. 
Part III introduces an alternative approach to the question of 
independent agencies' constitutionality. Rather than consider 
presidential prerogative as an ideal to uphold for its own sake, this 
Part outlines29 an analytical method that would focus on the overall 
balance of power between the three branches, asking whether 
sufficient checks exist to prevent tyranny by a given entity exercising 
federal power under prevailing conditions. This Article concludes, 
foremost, that Congress should provide mechanisms for ensuring fair 
process, public disclosure, and judicial review in legislation 
establishing novel structures for independent agencies. 
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
AND THE PCAOB 
The administrative bureaucracy has long been criticized as a 
"headless 'fourth branch' of the government," lacking in coordination 
and controPo Although the Constitution provides that there will be 
27. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 
2008), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
28. Cf Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive 
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 463 (1987) ("[Agency] 'independence' 
fosters the kind of supposedly creative tug-and-pull between Congress and the President 
that underlies the concept of checks and balances."). 
29. The precise contours of this approach will be explored further in a subsequent 
piece by the author. 
30. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 85 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. 
MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937)). Some commentators have 
gone much further with their criticism. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (declaring the post-New Deal 
administrative state "unconstitutional"). 
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executive "Departments,"31 it does not itself establish federal 
agencies. All institutions of the United States government-other 
than the President, the Vice President, the Supreme Court, and 
Congress-are created by Congress under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, including the multitudinous bureaucracies of unelected agents 
subordinate to the President.32 As a consequence, no single structure 
or definition exists for so-called "federal agencies." 
Nonetheless, a major distinction can be drawn between single-
headed or Cabinet-level agencies on the one hand and multi-member 
or independent entities on the other.33 Although legislatively 
denominated a "non-agency,"34 the PCAOB is structured like an 
independent agency,35 with one critical difference: the President lacks 
the power to appoint or remove its members.36 This Part reviews the 
traditional characteristics of the independent agency and how the 
PCAOB defies them. It then summarizes the dueling D.C. Circuit 
opinions on the constitutionality of the statute creating the Board 
which, as Part II discusses, reflect inherent shortcomings with 
prevailing law. 
A. The Traditional Independent Agency Model 
Having first emerged in the late nineteenth century,37 
independent agencies exercise a "full range" of regulatory and 
adjudicatory authority.38 Because of their "novelty in terms of 
anything imagined by the framers," independent agencies present a 
31. u.s. CON ST. art. II, § 2; see also id. art. I, § 9 (identifying a "Treasury" of the 
United States). 
32. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 2007); see also 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 107--D8 (1994) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the 
constitutional authority for independent agencies but suggesting that a strong showing of 
necessity is required); cf Lawson, supra note 30, at 1235 (arguing that the word "proper" 
requires that Congress enact laws that are "consistent with background principles of 
separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights"). 
33. See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory 
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236-94 (2000) 
(listing and describing existing independent agencies). 
34. 15 U.S.c. § 7211(b) (2006). 
35. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 680 
n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (refuting the contention that PCAOB is an independent agency upon 
finding that it is comprised of inferior officers), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 2378 (2009). 
36. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
37. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1117. 
38. Id. at 1112 ("[Independent agencies] can issue regulations, take administrative 
action to enforce their statutes and regulations, and decide cases through administrative 
adjudication. "). 
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challenge to the constitutional plan of government.39 In the words of 
Geoffrey Miller, "[t]here is little rhyme or reason" to Congress's 
choices with respect to their creation.40 Both the Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC") (an independent agency) and the Department 
of Justice ("DOJ") (a Cabinet-level agency), for example, enforce the 
federal antitrust laws.41 
The key element that differentiates independent agencies from 
Cabinet-level departments is insulation from presidential contro1.42 
Although the President appoints most members of independent 
agencies, he can generally only remove them "for cause" under 
express or implied statutory limitations.43 By contrast, Cabinet-level 
heads of executive departments mentioned in the Constitution can be 
removed at will by the President.44 
The President's appointment power is also attenuated for 
independent agencies. Commission or board members generally serve 
for fixed, staggered terms extending beyond a given President's term, 
rendering a new administration incapable of replacing them upon 
taking office.45 Additionally, independent agencies are exempt from a 
number of burdensome statutes and executive orders that add 
39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA W 131 (3d ed. 2000). 
40. Miller, supra note 1, at 73. 
41. Compare 15 V.S.c. §§ 45, 46 (2006) ("The [Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")] 
is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ... 
from using unfair methods of competition .... "), with 15 U.S.c. §§ 4, 25 (2006) ("[I]it shall 
be the duty of the several United States attorneys ... to institute proceedings in equity to 
prevent and restrain [violations of the federal antitrust laws]."). Peter Strauss has 
suggested that this happenstance is indicative of "the circumstances of the particular 
regulatory regime, the temper of presidential/congressional relations at the time, or the 
perceived success or failure of an existing agency performing like functions, more than any 
grand scheme of government." Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 585 (1984). Despite 
the apparent arbitrariness underlying the establishment of many independent agencies, 
even "the executive branch has not consistently opposed [them] on constitutional 
grounds." Miller, supra note 1, at 84. 
42. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1136; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 51 (listing 
seven characteristics that independent agencies "ralimost uniformly ... display"). 
43. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,626-32 (1935) (holding 
that Congress can impose "for cause" conditions on the President's removal of quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial officers). 
44. See John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and 
Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. V. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2004) (noting that Cabinet 
members may be fired at will). 
45. In recent years, Congress has also created single-headed independent agencies 
(such as the Social Security Administration) with administrators who serve fixed terms 
and has placed limits on the President's ability to remove them. Breger & Edles, supra 
note 33, at 1207-08. 
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procedural requirements and protections for members of the public46 
beyond those contained m the AP A's notice-and-comment 
rulemaking provisions.47 
The emergence of the independent form of agency reflected a 
belief that structuring government in a way that removes it from 
presidential influence and politics is a good thing.48 The theory is that 
agency independence facilitates logical decision making grounded in 
objective data and science.49 Accordingly, independent agencies are 
generally comprised of an odd number of individuals from competing 
political parties so that no more than a bare majority can dominate 
the political agenda.50 Although most modern enabling statutes do 
not dictate special qualifications or experience for members of 
independent agencies, others require empirical experts in particular 
areas of regulation to foster neutrality.51 
A prominent example of the traditional model of the 
independent agency is the SEC, which administers the federal 
securities laws and regulates firms and individuals engaged in the 
purchase or sale of securities.52 Its five members serve staggered five-
year terms and are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, with no more than three members coming from 
46. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 107 & n.438 (noting that independent 
agencies are expressly exempted from Executive Orders that require agencies to 
undertake cost-benefit analyses in connection with regulations). 
47. 5 U.S.C § 553 (2006). 
48. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1132 (explaining that the FIC emerged 
from the belief that apolitical experts-versus a single person-were required for an 
antitrust commission to develop a body of administrative law). 
49. See id. at 1130--31 (discussing the influence of the Progressive movement on 
Congress's establishment of independent agencies). Scholars dispute the expertise and 
apolitical rationales for independent agencies. See Miller, supra note 1, at 80 ("There is no 
evidence that the level of expertise in independent agencies is any higher than it is in 
executive branch agencies."); id. at 83 ("In agencies serving the interests of particular 
industries, it is all too possible for them to pass over the line of objectivity and become the 
advocates of their industries."); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 96 (discussing 
capture theory-which posits that regulatory agencies act in the interests of the dominant 
industries they are charged with regulating versus in the interests of the public-in relation 
to independent agencies); id. at 102 (suggesting that politics is at the core of so-called 
independent agencies). 
50. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1137. 
51. Id. at 1131. An example is the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, whose 
members must be experts in nuclear safety. Id. at 1140 (citing 42 U.S.C § 2286(b)(I) 
(1994)). The Federal Reserve Board must be selected "with due regard to a fair 
representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interests, and 
geographical divisions of the country." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C § 241 (1994)). 
52. See id. at 1285-86 (discussing the Securities and Exchange Commission (citing 15 
U.S.C § 78d to 78d-2 (1994))); see also id. at 1236-94 (listing and describing existing 
independent agencies). 
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the same political party.53 There is no statutory provision for their 
removal by the President,54 although lower courts have accepted the 
idea "that the President may remove a commissioner only for 
'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' ,,55 Despite its 
conventional structure, the SEC plays a critical role in distinguishing 
the PCAOB from the traditional independent agency because it-and 
not the President-appoints the Board's members. 
B. The PCAOB: A Blueprint for the "Non-Agency" Agency Within 
an Independent Agency 
The PCAOB is, indeed, a structural anomaly. During oral 
argument before the D.C. Circuit in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Co. Accounting Oversight Board,56 in which the constitutionality of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act") creating the PCAOB was 
challenged, the court observed that if the Act "were upheld, it would 
be a green light for all sorts of new creations, independent agencies 
within independent agencies."57 Having unavailingly pressed for a 
historical example of a similarly structured entity, the court offered 
an answer from the bench: "Zero. Zero. In our history."58 
Independent agencies were historically devised" '[w]ithout too 
much political theory,' "59 and the PCAOB is no exception. It was 
created in reaction to swelling criticism of the self-regulatory system 
that characterized the accounting profession prior to the scandals of 
Enron and WorldCom.60 Although the federal securities laws 
empower the SEC to regulate accounting methods for the 
preparation and auditing of financial statements, the SEC historically 
deferred to the accounting industry's principal trade association to set 
53. 15 U.S.c. § 78d(a) (2006). 
54. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1285. 
55. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988); accord MFS 
Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he power to remove 
Commissioners belongs to the President, and even that is 'commonly understood' to be 
limited to removal for 'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' ") 
56. 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 
(2009). 
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 667 (No. 07-5127) 
(Judge Kavanaugh speaking). 
58. [d. at 38. 
59. Miller, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 2 (1938)). 
60. See Stephen Labaton, A Push to Fix the Fix on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2006, at C4 (describing events leading up to creation of the PCAOB). 
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auditing standards.61 When the Enron debacle exploded at the end of 
2001, Congress revamped this failed system of self-regulation.62 After 
consideration of more than thirty bills, the Act was passed, and 
President George W. Bush signed it into law,63 substituting the 
PCAOB as the primary force behind auditing standards for the 
accounting industry.64 
The Board is a creature of Congress, but it does not reside 
squarely within the executive or legislative branches. Congress 
established the PCAOB as "a body corporate, [to] operate as a 
nonprofit corporation,,65-"not ... an agency or establishment of the 
United States Government"66-and deemed "[n]o member or person 
employed by, or agent for, the Board ... to be an officer or employee 
of or agent for the Federal Government."67 
Despite its legislative and self-described "private sector, 
nonprofit" persona,68 the PCAOB operates as an arm of the federal 
government69 with a distinctly public mission: "to oversee the audit of 
public companies that are subject to the securities laws ... in order to 
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit 
61. Nagy, supra note 7, at 984-86. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants ("AICPA") sets standards for so-called "generally accepted accounting 
principles" ("GAAP") and "generally accepted auditing standards" ("GAAS"); 
responsibility for the former was later absorbed by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board ("FASB"). Id. 
62. !d. at 996. 
63. Id. For an engaging discussion of the various proposals for structuring the entity 
that ultimately became the PCAOB, including competing views of appropriate executive 
oversight, see id. at 996-1006. 
64. See id. at 992 (citing Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Yawn: 
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919 
(2003) (recognizing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act took away the AICPA's decision-making 
power); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103(a)(3)(A)(ii), 116 Stat. 745, 
747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2006))). 
65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 100(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7211(a) (2006». 
66. 15 U.S.c. § 7211(a)-(b) (2006) ("[The Board] shall be subject to, and have all the 
powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by the District of Columbia Nonprofit 
Corporation Act. "). 
67. § 7211(b). 
68. See Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Home Page, 
http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited Nov. 17,2009). 
69. In the Free Enterprise Fund litigation, the PCAOB itself conceded that Board 
members are federal officers. See Brief of Appellees at 19, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127) ("Board members 
are unquestionably inferior officers [under the Constitution], and Congress properly 
lodged authority to appoint them in the Commissioner of the SEC-the head of the 
department that comprehensively oversees the Board's work."), reh'g en bane denied, cert. 
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
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reports.,,70 It is entrusted with five primary responsibilities:7! (1) 
registration of all domestic and foreign public accounting firms;72 (2) 
promulgation of rules establishing the auditing, quality control, and 
ethics standards for preparation of audit reports;73 (3) periodic 
inspections of registered accounting firms to evaluate compliance with 
securities laws;74 (4) investigations of registered firms for violations of 
such laws;75 and (5) imposition of disciplinary sanctions, with a 
maximum penalty of $750,000 for individuals and $15 million for 
firms.76 
70. § 7211(a). 
71. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 1007 (listing the PCAOB's principal responsibilities as 
set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
72. § 7211(c)(l). 
73. 15 V.S.c. § 7213(a)(l) (2006); see also 15 V.S.c. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(8) (2006) (amending 
the Exchange Act, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 V.S.c. §§ 78a-
78111 (2006)), to empower the Board to bar registered firms from performing non-audit 
services along with the audit of a public company); 15 V.S.c. § 7231 (2006) (empowering 
the Board to exempt firms from the prohibition of services under the Exchange Act). See 
generally Nagy, supra note 7, at 1011-12 (discussing PCAOB's duty to promulgate rules 
establishing standards for audit reports). 
74. 15 V.S.c. § 7214(a) (2006). 
75. 15 V.S.c. § 7215(b)(1) (2006). Applications for registration with the PCAOB must 
include "consent executed by the public accounting firm to cooperation in and compliance 
with any request for testimony or the production of documents made by the Board." 15 
V.S.c. § 7212(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
76. § 7215(c)(4). As a congressional experiment on delegating authority outside the 
boundaries of the executive branch, the PCAOB shares common ground with other 
entities operating on the fringe of presidential control. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 53 
(noting similarities between the PCAOB and other "mixed-character 'government 
entities' "). So-called self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") have long played a major 
role in oversight of the U.S. securities industry. For example, the regulatory, enforcement, 
and adjudicatory arms of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") recently merged their operations to become 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), which bills itself as "the largest 
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States." See 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, About FINFRA, http://www.finra.orgiAbout 
FINRA/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). There are a number of structural factors that 
distinguish SROs and government corporations from the independent agencies discussed 
here. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1228-31 (describing public corporations in the 
context of independent agencies); Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as 
Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246-50 (2007) (describing self-regulatory 
stock exchanges and their public interest role); Nagy, supra note 7, at 1022-29 (comparing 
PCAOB to SROs and government corporations). Similar accountability questions linger, 
however. Moreover, a different legal framework-the state action doctrine-is implicated 
in addressing those questions with respect to SROs and government corporations. See Am. 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (providing that, under the traditional 
state action doctrine, the analysis turns on whether a "sufficiently close nexus" exists 
between the state and the challenged action to deem a private entity a state actor for 
constitutional purposes). These issues are not discussed in any detail here. 
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Because Congress created the PCAOB "for the furtherance of 
governmental objectives,'m there is little question that the Board is a 
public entity subject to the strictures of the Constitution.78 In Lebron 
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,79 the Supreme Court held that 
Amtrak is a governmental unit for constitutional purposes despite a 
similar statutory declaration that it was a corporation and " 'not ... 
an agency or establishment of the United States Government.' "80 It 
rejected the contention that Congress can relieve "what the 
Constitution regards as the Government" by proclaiming an entity a 
private corporation.81 
Nonetheless, the PCAOB is different from Cabinet-level 
executive agencies exercIsmg powers of similar magnitude. 
Department heads are accountable to the President-and thus to the 
political process-through the powers of appointment and removal.82 
The PCAOB is comprised of five members who are appointed by the 
SEC. Board members serve staggered, five-year terms that are 
renewable once.83 Only the SEC may remove them, and only upon a 
showing of "good cause."B4 For the President to exert any control 
over the PCAOB through his constitutional appointment power, he 
must satisfy what opponents of the Act call its "double for-cause" 
provision;85 that is, he must dismiss SEC members for cause for failing 
to dismiss PCAOB members for cause. 
77. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). The statute creating 
Amtrak-like the statute creating the PCAOB-declared that it is not an agency or 
establishment of the U.S. Government. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, § 301, 84 Stat. 
1327, 1330, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). Unlike the PCAOB, 
however, Amtrak is federally funded and controlled by a board whose directors are largely 
appointed by the President. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 1037-38 (discussing Lebron). 
78. Indeed, the PCAOB defended the constitutional challenge on the merits in the 
Free Enterprise Fund case without making the claim that it is immune from constitutional 
scrutiny. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 19 ("[P]laintiffs' challenges fail on the 
merits."); see also Nagy, supra note 7, at 981-82, 1036-40 (arguing that the PCAOB is a 
public entity that is liable for constitutional violations under Lebron). 
79. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
80. [d. at 391 (quoting Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, § 301, 84 Stat. 1327, 1330, 
repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994»; see also Breger & Edles, supra 
note 33, at 1231-38 (discussing the emergence and use of public corporations). 
81. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400. 
82. Loren A. Smith,ludicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 427, 448 (noting that agencies are headed by a politically accountable individual 
whose links to the President are sustained by the appointment and removal powers). 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(I)-(5) (2006). 
84. § 7211(e)(6). 
85. Brief of Appellants at 6, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127), reh'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2378 (2009). 
2009] PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NON-AGENCY 85 
The bulk of the responsibility for keeping the Board's actions in 
check thus falls on the SEC, which also has broad (but not unlimited) 
oversight authority over the PCAOB. As a result, a key question 
regarding the legality of the Act's provisions creating the PCAOB is 
whether diverting oversight responsibility almost exclusively to 
another independent agency suffices under the Constitution. The 
D.C. Circuit considered this question in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,86 which is now pending 
before the Supreme Court. 
C. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB 
In 2006, a public accounting firm that underwent a PCAOB audit 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act that created Board,87 
raising two principal arguments: (1) that the Act violates the 
Constitution's Appointments Clause because the President has no 
authority to appoint or remove Board members; and (2) that the 
PCAOB's insulation from presidential control conflicts more 
generically with separation-of-powers principles.88 
The district court entered summary judgment for the PCAOB,89 
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed two to one.90 The majority observed 
that 
[t]he crux of the [plaintiffs'] challenge-that the double for-
cause limitation on removal makes it impossible for the 
President to perform his duties-is a question of first 
impression as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has 
86. 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 
(2009). 
87. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 WL 
891675, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), affd, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane 
denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). For more information regarding the 
accounting firm itself and the results of the inspection, see PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING 
OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 104-2005-082, INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD & 
W A TIS, LLP 2-5 (2005), available at http://www.pcaobus.org!Inspections/Public_Reports 
12005IBeckstead_and_ Watts.pdf. 
88. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *4-5. On appeal, the Board characterized 
the case as a facial challenge, and the majority and dissent sparred over whether this 
characterization affected the analysis, with the dissenting judge suggesting that the 
distinction was unimportant as "this is not the kind of case where a statute might be 
applied constitutionally in some instances but not in others." Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 
704 n.12 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). But ef id. at 684 n.14 (majority opinion) ("[T]he fact 
that this is a facial challenge significantly affects the analysis."). 
89. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *4-5. 
90. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 669. 
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considered a situation where a restriction on removal passes 
through two levels of control.91 
A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in May of 2009.92 
1. Appointment and Removal 
The D.C. Circuit found no violation of the Appointments 
Clause.93 The Constitution provides that "[t]he President ... shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States."94 "[B]ut," it 
continues, "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."95 Thus, although the 
President alone appoints "Officers," Congress can authorize courts or 
department heads to appoint "inferior Officers. "96 As a consequence, 
if PCAOB members are "principal" officers, the SEC cannot appoint 
them.97 If they are "inferior," the SEC can appoint them so long as it 
constitutes a "Head of Department.,,98 These constitutional terms are 
not defined. 
Applying the Supreme Court's reading of "inferior officer" in 
Edmond v. United States,99 the D.C. Circuit majority held that the 
Board is composed of officers inferior to the SEC. IOO Under Edmond, 
"the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher 
ranking officer or officers below the President. ,,101 Because the SEC 
"exercise[s] comprehensive control over Board procedures and 
decisions and Board members,"I02 the court reasoned, its exclusive 
91. [d. at 679. 
92. [d.; Free Enterprise Fund, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
93. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 669. 
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-33 (1976) (interpreting the Constitution's 
reference to "inferior officers" to mean that Congress cannot appoint principal officers). 
98. For the Free Enterprise Fund court's analysis of this issue, see infra notes 102--05 
and accompanying text. 
99. 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997). 
100. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 672-76 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
101. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662. 
102. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672-76 (citing various provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). 
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authority to appoint and remove them is constitutional. 103 The dissent 
retorted that Board members are principal-not inferior-officers. 104 
In the dissent's view, they would be inferior only if the SEC could 
remove them "for failure to follow substantive SEC direction" with 
respect to Board inspections, investigations, and enforcement 
actions,105 that is, the exercise of quintessential indicia of executive 
power. As discussed below,106 this debate over inferior status is at the 
heart of the legal questions raised by the Free Enterprise Fund case. 
2. Separation of Powers 
As for the plaintiffs' alternative argument that the "double for-
cause" structure undermines the President's prerogative to "take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"107 the majority employed a 
facile, "mountain-versus-molehill"108 reading of Morrison v. Olson,109 
the seminal decision in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge 
to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978.11° Although "the President does not directly select or 
supervise the Board's members," the D.C. Circuit reasoned, he 
possesses "significant influence over the Commission"-which in turn 
exercises "comprehensive control over the Board"111-through his 
power to appoint "[l]ike-minded [SEC] Commissioners" and remove 
103. Id. at 680 ("The Board's status, as a heavily controlled component of an 
independent agency, is fully congruent with the paradigm laid out in Humphrey's 
Executor. "). 
104. Id. at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
105. [d. The majority rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, even if Board members 
are inferior officers, the Commission is not a "Department" and its five Commissioners 
are not its "Head." [d. at 676 (majority opinion). The majority reasoned that, although the 
Supreme Court did not resolve in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991), 
whether independent agencies are "Departments," it loosely described "Departments" as 
"like the Cabinet-level departments." Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 667. The D.C. Circuit 
found the SEC to be Cabinet-like. [d. Given that independent agencies are constitutional 
under Humphrey's Executor, it added, the SEC must accordingly be allowed to exercise its 
legislatively-authorized power to appoint inferior officers. Id. The majority concluded 
that, although the SEC Chairman is not an agency "Head," the plaintiffs "pointed to no 
authority wherein the Framers foreclosed Congress from granting multi-member 
commissions authority to appoint inferior officers." [d. at 677-78. The dissent agreed that 
"both text and longstanding Executive interpretation confirm that the head of a 
department can consist of multiple persons." Id. at 712 n.24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
106. See infra Part II.B.1-3. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
108. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 n.ll. 
109. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
110. Id. at 660--61 (reviewing the constitutionality of 28 U.S.c. §§ 49, 591-599 (Supp. V 
1982». 
111. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681. 
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them for cause. ll2 "[B]ecause the Board is subject to much greater 
Executive control than the independent counsel," the court dismissed 
what it called a "'sky is falling' ... response to a relatively 
insignificant innovation. ,,113 
The dissent responded that the essential levers of presidential 
power include the ability to direct the actions of "alter egos" within 
the executive branch.114 Viewed in this light, the PCAOB is a far cry 
from the independent agency model previously endorsed by the 
Supreme Court. To be sure, members of traditional independent 
agencies are removable for cause-but by the President. In Morrison, 
the Attorney General retained the authority to remove the 
independent counsel, and the President retained the authority to 
remove the Attorney General at will. By contrast, the SEC is not a 
presidential "alter ego" like the Attorney General, as Commissioners 
can only be removed for cause.ll5 
Thus, the dissent added, the arrangement between the SEC, the 
PCAOB, and the President is inconsistent with a "constitutional 
structure [that is] premised ... on the notion that such unaccountable 
power is inconsistent with individual liberty. ,,116 Congress constrained 
the President's influence in the appointment and removal of PCAOB 
members to ordering SEC Commissioners to remove Board members 
for cause, and firing them if they refuse. "For cause" restrictions do 
not enable the President to remove Commissioners for failing to take 
the discretionary act of firing a Board member,117 and even if they did, 
removal of a Commissioner would not result in removal of a Board 
member unless the President with Senate confirmation replaced a 
majority of SEC Commissioners with individuals willing to fire sitting 
112. [d. at 682. 
113. [d. at 681 n.ll. The independent counsel could be removed" 'only by the personal 
action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental 
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such 
independent counsel's duties.' " Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 596(a)(1) 
(Supp. V 1982». The Attorney General was required to submit a report to both the 
Special Division (a special court created by the Act to appoint independent counsels) and 
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and House. Id. at 663-64 (citing 28 U.s.c. 
§ 596(a)(2) (Supp. V 1982». The Special Division could terminate the office of the 
independent counsel at any time upon a finding that its investigation was "substantially 
completed." [d. at 664 (quoting 28 V.S.c. § 596(b)(2) (Supp. V. 1982». The statute also 
provided for congressional oversight of the independent counsel's activities. Id. (citing 28 
U.S.c. § 595(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982». 
114. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 688. 
117. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 85, at 19. 
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PCAOB membersYs Satisfied that the "double for-cause" provision 
readily survived Morrison, however, the D.C. Circuit majority did not 
engage the dissent on the normative question of whether the Act 
enabled "unaccountable power" in conflict with broader separation of 
powers principles. ll9 
II. ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY: AD Hoc STANDARDS AND 
EXECUTIVE POWER PER SE 
Although unsatisfying, the D.C. Circuit majority's decision seems 
technically correct. As this Part explains, Morrison on its face leaves 
Congress tremendous leeway to configure independent agencies in a 
manner that severs them from traditional mechanisms of 
accountability. After looking first to the text of the Constitution for 
guidance, this Part critiques the "incompletely defined"120 modes of 
prevailing analysis of the constitutionality of legislation constraining 
presidential appointment and removal power and identifies two key 
problems. First, the crown jewel of Morrison-its so-called "core 
functions" inquiry-is effectively trumped by its preliminary analysis 
of the term "inferior officer." Because the Court has defined 
inferiority by virtue of an officer's structurally subordinate position-
rather than by the scope of his authority-there is little chance that 
the President's power will be considered compromised if he cannot 
directly terminate an inferior officer for any reason. As a result, 
Congress is free to render agencies unaccountable to the public 
through a democratically-elected branch of government. The second 
is a fundamental bootstrapping problem: the failure to resolve 
requisite questions regarding the scope of core executive power over 
agencies. l2l Because the Court has failed to define the foundational 
concept of presidential core functions, Morrison provides a shaky 
foundation on which to scrutinize the constitutionality of legislation 
establishing new agencies. This Part concludes that something akin to 
a "presidential accountability" approach has greater potential for 
systematically distinguishing between problematic agency structures 
118. See id. at 21-22. 
119. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 688 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
120. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 225 (5th ed. 2003). 
121. See generally Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's 
Separation of Powers, 51 u.c.L.A. L. REV. 1079, 1095 (2004) (" 'Core function' as 
currently constituted poses deep and perhaps insurmountable problems because as a 
theoretical matter, it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the supposedly 'separate 
and distinct' powers of government."). 
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and tolerable ones, but suggests that it too ultimately falls short 
because of its narrow focus on executive power per se. 
A. The Constitutional Text 
Although scholars dispute the propriety of functionalism as a 
mode of constitutional analysis,122 it is largely beyond debate that 
constitutional text is a proper starting point for evaluating the 
legitimacy of novel entities like the PCAOB.123 Few clues appear in 
the Constitution as to what the framers intended the executive 
apparatus to look like beyond the President and the Vice President. It 
is clear that they envisioned the creation of executive departments, 
each headed by a "principal Officer" appointed exclusively by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.124 The 
constitutional text enables the President to "require the Opinion, in 
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any SUbject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."125 
It thus suggests that the framers conceived of subordinate executive 
officials with policymaking roles. 126 The only enterprise that the 
Constitution expressly links to such officials is the "executive 
Department," for which there will be a principal officer-"the 
principal Officer"127-whom only the President can appoint.128 
122. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513,1522-29 (1991); Strauss, supra note 4, at 489-92; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism 
After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-96 (1987). But cf Sargentich, supra note 
28, at 458 (noting that critiques of formalism exist and that those critiques focus on the 
idea that the law is in reality very similar to morals and politics in many respects). 
123. See Miller, supra note 1, at 57 (advocating a "neoclassical" approach to analyzing 
the constitutionality of independent agencies and noting that such an analysis should start 
from the constitutional text, interpreted "in light of the tripartite structure established by 
the Framers"). But see William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 
983, 998-1000 (2009) (arguing that textualists wrongly assume that text was central to 
meaning at the time of the founding). 
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
125. [d. Professors Lessig and Sunstein suggest that, without the Opinions Clause, it is 
not evident that the President would have had the power to direct the departments to 
report to him as a matter of constitutional necessity. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 
34. The Opinions Clause thus prevents Congress from creating agencies completely 
severed from presidential control. See id. Peter Strauss has identified another potential 
constitutional problem with the PCAOB that is grounded in the Opinions Clause, viz., 
whether Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has "discovered a way impermissibly to 
delegate important executive 'duties' to officials who are beyond the President's effective 
ability to command an 'Opinion, in writing' on the matter in which those duties will be 
exercised." Strauss, supra note 16, at 59. 
126. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 86-87. 
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added). 
128. Because the Constitution separately refers to "Heads" of "Departments," there is 
a counterargument that if "the principal officer" and department heads were one and the 
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Thus, the framers may have envisioned an executive branch 
composed of numerous departments with single heads below the 
President who, in turn, may be authorized by Congress to appoint 
"inferior" officers.129 They could have drafted the text to leave room 
for the creation of agencies headed by boards or commissions 
comprised of mUltiple individuals-by stating, for example, that the 
President may require the written opinion of "principal Officers in 
executive Departments," or of "any principal Officer." The precise 
use of the word "the" suggests that multiple "principal Officers" may 
not have been within the constitutional purview for an executive 
department. Yet even the dissenting D.C. Circuit judge in Free 
Enterprise Fund accepted without hesitation that multi-headed 
independent agencies comport with the constitutional "executive 
Department" concept.130 
The Supreme Court has not relied on the Opinions Clause to 
assess the constitutionality of entities operating "independent" of the 
President; it has looked instead through the lens of the Appointments 
Clause.l31 The Constitution is quite explicit with respect to the 
President's appointment power,132 but it says nothing about his 
authority to remove officers. Article II, Section 4 provides for 
congressional removal of officers only by impeachment. 133 A reader 
"could reasonably believe: that impeachment is the only permissible 
form of removal ... [or] that Congress's power to create offices 
carries with it the power to prescribe the form of removal."134 
Alternatively, removal by the President could be contingent-like 
same, there is little reason---other than inadvertence-for the framers to have made the 
distinction. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 34--35 (citing U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 2). 
The framers' separate reference to "executive Departments" in the Opinions Clause also 
raises the question of whether some other type of department could exist. ld. at 35. 
129. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
130. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dis3enting), rch'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 
(2009). 
131. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670--71 (1988) (assessing the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute under the Appointments Clause). 
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments. "). 
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("[A]ll Civil Officers of the United States, shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."). 
134. Lawson, supra note 30, at 1244 n.74. 
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appointment-on the advice and consent of the Senate.135 Alexander 
Hamilton stated, regarding the Senate's role, that "the consent of that 
body would be necessary to displace as well as appoint. "136 
Although Congress historically embraced Hamilton's view of the 
removal process,137 the Supreme Court ultimately did not.n8 Initially, 
in Myers v. United States,B9 it understood the President's power to 
remove officers to be incident to the appointment power and 
"exclusive" to the President. l40 The Court narrowed the scope of 
Myers in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,141 however, and 
upheld legislative restrictions on the President's removal powers.142 
Rather than hewing closely to constitutional text, the Court based its 
decision on pragmatic concerns that the "coercive influence" of 
presidential removal power threatened agencies' ability to act with 
independence.143 It concluded that, so long as the agency in question 
exercised "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" as well as executive 
functions, Congress could forbid the President from removing 
officials except "for cause."l44 Humphrey's Executor is considered the 
seminal case that legitimated independent agencies as a constitutional 
matter.145 As Peter Strauss has observed, the Supreme Court has 
signaled a reluctance to disturb the well-entrenched legality of 
independent agencies since Humphrey's Executor and "[m]ost of the 
literature thriving under the influence of these cases has assumed 
such an outcome, indeed struggled for a means of justifying it. "146 
135. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 103. 
136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961). 
137. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 103. 
138. See infra Part II.B.2. 
139. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
140. [d. at 106. 
141. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
142. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 104 & n.70. 
143. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 630. 
144. [d. at 629, 631-32; see also Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) 
(preventing President Eisenhower from removing, without cause, a member of the War 
Crimes Commission with quasi-judicial duties). Humphrey's Executor has been called 
"one of the more egregious opinions to be found on pages of the United States Supreme 
Court Reports." Miller, supra note 1, at 93 (citations omitted). Taken to its logical 
extreme, the Humphrey's approach enables Congress to render even Cabinet-level 
officials removable for cause simply by including in their job descriptions quasi-judicial or 
quasi-legislative functions. But cf id. at 66 (suggesting that such functions can be 
considered "purely executive in nature" as agencies are simply executing legislative 
mandates). 
145. See MASHAW ET AL.,supra note 120, at 225. 
146. Strauss, supra note 4, at 490. 
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B. The Leading Approach and Its Limits 
The implication of Humphrey's Executor, that Congress may 
tinker with the President's power to appoint and remove, has enabled 
modern legislators to comfortably experiment with new forms of 
independent agencies. Litigants seeking to challenge entities like the 
PCAOB find themselves in a double bind: they must either confront 
the very concept that limitations on the President's power to appoint 
and remove officials are constitutional or find a principled way to 
distinguish a new agency structure from the panoply of existing 
independent agencies.147 Because Morrison sets forth the most current 
approach to evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that constrain 
the President's ability to remove officers exercising executive power, 
its capacity to accommodate evolving bureaucratic structures is 
critical to ensuring that Congress does not stray too far from the 
Constitution's tripartite system when it legislates the existence of new 
agencies. But the standard applied in Morrison raises more questions 
than it answers.148 At least two problems predominate. First, the 
Court relied on the ambiguous distinction between "principal" and 
"inferior" officer to effectively render Congress in complete control 
of the scope of the President's constitutional power to appoint and 
remove officers exercising executive power.149 So long as Congress 
makes top officers structurally subordinate to someone else, the 
President's appointment and removal power falls by the wayside 
regardless of the scope of executive power afforded that officer. 
Second, the Morrison Court overlooked the requisite definition of 
147. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 
685 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The bulk of the [plaintiffs'] challenge to the Act was fought-and 
lost-over seventy years ago when the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Executor. "), 
reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
148. See Kevin M. Stack, The Story a/Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and 
Independent Agencies in Watergate's Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 401, 442 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (noting that Morrison left 
open numerous questions, including why Congress's power to create independent agencies 
is best explained by impairment of executive functions, how core functions balancing 
should be performed, and the theoretical justification for agency independence). 
149. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,671 (1988) ("We need not attempt here to decide 
exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because in our view 
appellant clearly falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line ... appellant is subject to 
removal by a higher Executive Branch official."); see also infra notes 162--64 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Morrison Court's analysis of whether the independent 
counsel was a "principal" or "inferior" officer). The Supreme Court did not provide a 
definitive test for inferior status in subsequent decisions addressing the issue, either. See 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) ("Our cases have not set forth an 
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for 
Appointments Clause purposes."); see also infra notes 169-71 (discussing Edmond). 
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"core executive functions" in holding that, whatever they may be, the 
independent counsel statute did not compromise them.150 Even if 
there were such a definition, the Court provided no meaningful 
standards for ascertaining when a statute impermissibly interfered 
with such functions. l5l As a result, the prevailing law is feckless and 
ill-suited for evaluating the constitutionality of novel entities like the 
PCAOB. 
1. Morrison v. Olson 
Without overruling Humphrey's Executor, the Morrison Court 
discarded the distinction between purely executive and quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial functions in favor of an alternative 
functional approach to analyzing infringements on the President's 
authority to remove appointed officials. 152 To state the goal of 
Morrison's "core functions" test is to define it: "to ensure that 
Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the 
'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty 'to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article 11."153 The 
Court thus identified the locus of executive authority in two 
provisions of Article II-the "Vesting Clause," which lodges 
"executive power" in the President alone,154 and the "Take Care 
Clause," which provides that the President shall ensure faithful 
execution of the laws.155 It then established a constitutional standard 
that tolerates infringements on the President's removal authority so 
long as the core executive functions derived from Article II are not 
unduly compromised.156 
In Morrison, the question before the Court was whether a 
provision of the Ethics in Government Act limiting the President's 
ability to remove the independent counsel impermissibly interfered 
150. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-93. 
151. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 513 ("While 'core functions' may be the best that the 
most sophisticated of analysts can suggest, it has no stable content.") (citations omitted). 
Professors Lessig and Sunstein note that the composition of the President's core functions 
depends heavily on the amount of presidential removal (hence supervisory) power that the 
statutory words afford. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 110. 
152. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90. 
153. [d. 
154. Cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 47-48 (arguing that the Vesting Clause 
only refers to which branch of government has executive power, not what that power 
consists of). 
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1,3. 
156. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 ("[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions 
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional 
duty .... "). 
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with the President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed 
functions. 157 Under the statute, only the Attorney General could 
remove the independent counsel and " 'only for good cause.' ,,158 In 
holding that the "good cause" provision did not interfere with the 
President's core executive functions,159 the Court left scant room for 
finding novel independent agency structures unconstitutional. 
Two features of the Morrison decision operate to protect 
subsequent statutory schemes from serious constitutional scrutiny. 
The first is the Court's hinging of the core functions query on a 
potentially circular and over-inclusive cause-and-effect test: if an 
officer is inferior, the analysis goes, the President's ability to fire at 
will is not central to the exercise of his "executive power" under the 
Vesting Ciause160 or his executive functions under the Take Care 
Clause.161 In Morrison, the independent counsel was deemed inferior 
largely because she was "subject to removal by a higher Executive 
Branch official"-the Attorney General,162 Because the "inferior" 
label fit, the Court found that the President's need to control the 
exercise of the independent counsel's discretion was not "so central to 
the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require ... that the 
counsel be terminable at will by the President."163 The label, in other 
157. ld. at 685. The Court relatedly asked whether, "taken as a whole, the Act violates 
the separation of powers by reducing the President's ability to control the prosecutorial 
powers wielded by the independent counsel." Id. 
158. ld. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 596(a)(I) (Supp. V 1982». 
159. ld. at 691. 
160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
161. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (reasoning that, unlike the hypothetical case where 
removal power over an executive official has been completely stripped from the President, 
thereby removing any means to ensure "faithful execution" of the laws, the statute in 
question gave him authority to ensure the independent counsel's competent performance 
by virtue of the Attorney General's power to remove her for cause); see also id. at 695-96 
(finding no separation of powers violation because the Attorney General retained the 
authority to remove the independent counsel for cause). 
162. ld. at 671. She also had "limited jurisdiction and tenure and lack[ed] policymaking 
or significant administrative authority." ld. As discussed below, these factors do not serve 
to meaningfully distinguish between principal officers and inferior ones. See infra notes 
189-91 and accompanying text. 
163. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; see Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997). 
There are few contemporaneous Signals as to what the framers had in mind in drawing this 
distinction between "Officer" and "inferior Officer," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 2, as "the 
inferior appointment provision was added on the last day of the Convention with virtually 
no discussion." United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing 2 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627-28 (Max Farrand ed., Yale 
University Press rev. ed. 1937) (1911» ("There was little discussion of this [inferior 
officer] component of the provision during the Constitutional Convention."). Nineteenth-
century jurisprudence suggested that the framers created the lesser classification because 
they foresaw that, "when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary," 
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words, satisfied the elusive requirements of Article II even though 
"[t]here is no real dispute that the functions performed by the 
independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law 
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by 
officials within the Executive Branch. "164 
One might thus arguably derive a two-part, bright-line rule for 
the constitutionality of new independent agencies from the Court's 
inferior officer analysis. First, if an officer is subject to removal by 
someone other than the President, inferior status follows,165 regardless 
of the level of executive or policy-making authority endowed upon 
that officer. l66 The Supreme Court has been hard-pressed to identify a 
"principal" officer below the rank of department head who is 
removable by the President.167 Second, if an officer is deemed 
inferior, he may constitutionally escape presidential at-will removal 
on that basis. The Court eschewed consideration of the nature and 
scope of the authority exercised by an officer when it pronounced in 
Edmond v. United States that "[t]he exercise of significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States marks, not the line between 
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate "might be inconvenient." 
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1879). The distinction thus became 
meaningful only with the proliferation of new posts and agencies in the mid- to late-
twentieth century. 
164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. 
165. Id. at 671 (finding independent counsel inferior because she was removable by the 
Attorney General); see also, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 
2d 389, 419 (D. Conn. 2008) ("The fact that the [Associate Deputy Secretary] serves at the 
pleasure of the Secretary and can be removed by him at any time is indicative of his 
subordinate role to the Secretary."); cf United States v. Sotomayor Vazquez, 69 F. Supp. 
2d 286, 291 (D.P.R. 1999) (holding that a United States Attorney is inferior to the 
Attorney General for purposes of the Appointments Clause even though the Attorney 
General lacks removal power). 
166. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
167. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (judge of Coast Guard 
Court of Criminal Appeals is inferior); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991) 
(special trial judge is inferior); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 655 (1988) (independent 
counsel is inferior); Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (Federal 
Election Commissioners are inferior); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 
344,352-53 (1931) (United States commissioners are inferior); Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 158 (1926) (postmaster first class is inferior); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 
419, 424 (1901) (United States commissioners in Indian territory are inferior); United 
States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331,343 (1898) (vice consuls are inferior); Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879) (election supervisors are inferior); In re Hennan, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
230,258-59 (1839) (district court clerks are inferior); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 
U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (military judges, like ordinary commissioned 
military officers, are inferior). But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the SEC is a department head). reh'g 
en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
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principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but 
rather ... the line between officer and non-officer."168 
Even absent removal power, an officer can be deemed inferior if 
a court is satisfied that he is supervised or directed by someone other 
than the President.169 In Edmond, the Court suggested that "direction 
and supervision"-as distinct from the power to remove-is a critical 
component to whether an officer is "inferior."170 Hence, if Congress 
structures an agency to ensure some measure of supervision or 
removal authority below the President himself, the President's 
appointment and removal powers are not readily triggered. 171 
To be sure, one might take the view that Congress ought not to 
be constrained in its ability to fashion agencies with independence 
from presidential control and supervision. In other words, Congress's 
ability to unilaterally decide whether to confer "at-will" removal 
authority on the President is a reasonable outgrowth of express 
168. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169. Indeed, courts have repeatedly found United States Attorneys "inferior" even 
though they are appointed by the President because they are "directed and supervised at 
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and 
consent of the Senate." United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997»; see United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 
987,999 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that United States Attorneys are "inferior" officers), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(determining that interim United States Attorneys and United States Attorneys are 
"inferior" officers because they are "statutorily under the direction and control of the 
Attorney General"); United States v. Sotomayor Vazquez, 69 F. Supp. 2d 286, 291 (D.P.R. 
1999) ("United States Attorneys, including interim United States Attorneys, are 'inferior' 
officers for Appointments Clause purposes."); see also United States v. Libby, 429 F. 
Supp. 2d 27, 45 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that Patrick J. Fitzgerald, who was appointed 
special counsel by the Attorney General to investigate the possible unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information about Valerie Plame Wilson's affiliation to the Central 
Intelligence Agency, was an inferior officer). 
170. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. Peter Strauss observes that, in permitting the Secretary 
of Transportation to appoint members of the Coast Guard's Court of Criminal Appeals, 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Edmond v. United States that "in the context of a 
clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important government 
assignments, we think it evident that 'inferior officers' are officers whose work is directed 
and supervised at some level by others who are appointed by presidential nomination with 
the advice and consent of the Senate." Strauss, supra note 16, at 58 (quoting Edmond v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997». Interestingly, Professor Strauss derives two 
constitutional requirements from the "two halves" of this sentence-preservation of 
political accountability on the one hand and direction and supervision by appointees on 
the other-and suggests that there is a "disconnect" between them in the Free Enterprise 
Fund case, with the PCAOB satisfying the latter but not the former. See id. 
171. Because Morrison and Edmond emphasize different factors in evaluating "inferior 
officer" status, these two cases have been construed as providing only "a modicum of 
guidance on the distinction between principal and inferior officers." United States v. 
Hilario, 218 F.3d 19,23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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constitutional text enabling Congress to vest the appointment of 
inferior officers in someone other than the President. The problem 
with construing prevailing law this way is that it fails to address the 
accountability problems that arise when a policymaking, law-
enforcing entity is structured to operate independent of presidential 
or judicial scrutiny. By the same token, it assumes the answer to a 
question the Court has never expressly addressed: whether some limit 
on Congress's ability to create "non-agency" agencies severed from 
traditional means of accountability is appropriate. 172 
2. What Are "Core Executive Functions"? 
Second, even without the "inferior officer" loophole, Morrison's 
"core functions" inquiry fails as a workable test for identifying 
unconstitutional independent agency arrangements for another 
critical reason: the Court neglected to engage in a substantive analysis 
of what the President's "constitutionally assigned duties" are in the 
first place.173 As a consequence, the notion of "core functions" 
remains indeterminate and therefore difficult to apply predictably 
and non-arbitrarily in a given case.174 The Morrison Court made clear 
that the President's "take care" power contemplates some influence 
on the removal process,175 but what actual powers comprise the 
President's core constitutional prerogative remains uncertain. 
The Constitution bears no definition of the executive or 
legislative power, and provides scant guidance on what constitutes a 
"case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article 111.176 It is 
difficult "aggressively to apply textual and structural devices to 
impart constitutional meaning to 'executive' ... functions."177 A test 
172. Some might alternatively argue that the removal-supervision-direction test for 
"inferior" status provides an appropriate limit on Congress's power. Because it is easy to 
draft legislation rendering an official subordinate to another, such a test remains 
problematic to the extent it can be satisfied without careful scrutiny of whether the 
arrangement violates broader constitutional principles. 
173. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). 
174. See Lawson, supra note 30, at 1245 (opining that "[t]he absence of a functioning 
unitary executive principle" may have made it possible for Congress to grant "agencies 
their current, almost-limitless powers"). 
175. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90 (observing that its analysis in prior removal cases 
was designed to prevent congressional interference with the President's constitutionally 
appointed "take care" duty). 
176. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the Judicial Branch of government and 
setting forth its powers). 
177. Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative 
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 291 (1987). This may not have been an oversight on the 
part of the framers: it retains flexibility as the federal apparatus evolves over time. 
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that hinges on consensus around the constitutional meaning of core 
executive functions, therefore, is inherently fraught with peril. 
At a minimum, the Morrison Court conceded that faithful 
execution of the laws is accomplished through investigation and 
prosecution.178 It follows that there must be some boundary of 
infringement which, if crossed, tags certain encroachments on 
investigative and prosecutorial power as unconstitutional under the 
core functions test. Yet Morrison blurred any such boundary in 
allowing the independent counsel to exercise executive power to 
investigate the President himself-power which included "framing 
and signing indictments ... and handling all aspects of any case, in the 
name of the United States."179 The majority reasoned that such core 
functions-although belonging to the President in the first instance-
were not impeded in Morrison because the President retained some 
authority over the independent counsel's exercise of such functions 
by virtue of the Attorney General's power to remove her for good 
cause.180 Contrast this, the Court suggested, with a statute that 
"completely stripped" the President of removal power. l8l 
Presumably, Congress could not "completely strip" the President 
of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers by creating a free-
standing agency outside the tripartite system, with members 
appointed by someone other than the President, and removable by-
and thus answerable to-no one. So long as independent agencies are 
per se constitutional,182 however, it is difficult realistically to conceive 
178. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; see also id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the independent counsel possesses full power to exercise all investigative and 
prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General and Department of Justice, and therefore 
the independent counsel's functions are executive and infringe upon separation of 
powers). Congress exercises a similar function with its legislative powers to obtain 
information through congressional investigations and punish refusals to testify with 
contempt, although the Supreme Court has made clear that this power is not to be 
confused with the powers of law enforcement assigned to the executive branch and the 
judiciary, and is subject to constitutional constraints such as the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 
(1955); see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (noting that legislative 
investigatory powers have "long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate"). 
179. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 681 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 2378 (2009). 
180. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96. 
181. Id. at 692. 
182. In Morrison, the Court reiterated its holding in Humphrey's Executor "that the 
Constitution did not give the President 'illimitable power of removal' over the officers of 
independent agencies." /d. at 687 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602,629 (1935)). 
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of an agency structure that would satisfy the Morrison Court's 
rhetorical outlier. The Court has effectively held that limitations on 
the President's power to remove board or commission members do 
not "completely strip" the President of his removal power, regardless 
of the scope of executive power exercised by them. IS3 It has effectively 
held that limitations on the President's power to remove officers 
exercising unfettered investigative and prosecutorial discretion do not 
"completely strip" the President of his removal power, either. l84 The 
Court has also made clear that Congress cannot retain the power to 
remove appointed officers.ls5 So what did it mean in referring to a 
hypothetical statute that "completely strips" the President of removal 
power? Such impermissible legislation would, in theory, lodge such 
power either exclusively in the courts, in a government agency, or in a 
private party. Although the Constitution allows Congress to give 
courts the power to appoint inferior officers,ls6 a statute that shifted 
from the President to the courts the power to appoint principal 
officers would presumably be unconstitutional on separation-of-
powers grounds. IS7 But what about shifting that power to agencies? 
Again, a statute that allowed an agency to appoint a Cabinet-level 
official would likely be unconstitutional. But so long as Congress 
sandwiches a layer of bureaucracy between the President and the 
official in question, his resulting inferior status would protect 
legislation constraining the President's removal power from an 
Appointments Clause challenge, regardless of whether broader 
constitutional principles relating to "core executive power" are in 
play. As a practical matter, therefore, Morrison may well "create[] a 
safe harbor for independent agencies"-such as the PCAOB-whose 
members are appointed and removed by another independent 
agency. ISS 
183. See id. 
184. Id. The Court has not resolved whether independent agencies are departments. 
See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991) (reserving this question). Thus, the 
Court might entertain an argument that the SEC cannot appoint (and thus cannot 
remove) inferior officers because it is not a department and its five Commissioners are not 
department heads. As Justice Scalia observed in his Freytag concurrence, however, this 
argument does not make much sense so long as Humphrey's Executor remains good law. 
Id. at 920-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 712 n.24 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Scalia's concurrence). 
185. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,726 (1986). 
186. U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 2, d. 2. 
187. Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (finding unconstitutional on 
separation of powers grounds a statute that enabled removal of postmasters only with the 
advice and consent of the Senate). 
188. Stack, supra note 148, at 441. 
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The dissenting D.C. Circuit judge in Free Enterprise Fund 
attempted to distinguish Morrison because, unlike the PCAOB, the 
independent counsel's jurisdiction was confined, her tenure was 
restricted, and her duties were limited by DOJ policies.189 Every 
Cabinet-level appointee, however, has limited jurisdiction and limited 
duties. And even the Attorney General must abide by DOJ policies. 
Moreover, it was the independent counsel who "determined when her 
statutory duties were complete," and she could request that her 
prosecutorial jurisdiction be expanded.190 As the headline-grabbing 
Whitewater investigation suggested, this aspect of the statute 
operated to enlarge the prosecutorial freedom of the independent 
counsel. l9l Unlike a line prosecutor faced with finite resources and 
policy preferences of the Attorney General and main DOJ, the 
independent counsel's budget was unlimited and she answered on a 
day-to-day basis to no one. Despite best efforts, therefore, the facts of 
Morrison make it hard to condemn legislation that severs executive 
officials from presidential control. 
Scholars have attempted to distill executive power beyond the 
tasks of investigation and prosecution. A key battlefront concerns the 
question of whether Article II establishes presidential control over 
agencies' discretionary authority or whether Congress may vest such 
authority in subordinate officers free from direct control of the 
President. l92 Geoffrey Miller argues, for example, that "[ t ]he 
President retains the constitutional power to direct the officer to take 
particular actions within his or her discretion or to refrain from acting 
when the officer has discretion not to act," and that Congress may not 
constitutionally deny the President the power to remove officials who 
189. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d. at 708 n.17 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
191. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons from History: Why There 
Must Be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 1-2 (2000). 
192. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 10 (observing that, for believers in a 
strongly unitary executive, "the so-called independent agencies are in conspicuous 
violation of the Constitution"); see also Lawson, supra note 30, at 1241 (describing 
scholarly debate). But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 20--30 (debunking the 
unitary executive theory and arguing that, historically, prosecutors were not answerable to 
the President, nor were all departments according to the framing Congress). Thus far, 
"[n]o modern judicial decision specifically addresses the President's power either directly 
to make all discretionary decisions within the executive department or to nullify the 
actions of insubordinate subordinates." Lawson, supra note 30, at 1244; see also Thomas 
O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking 36 AM. U. L. 
REV. 443, 465-66 (1987) (discussing the implications of the executive power on 
discretionary decisions and Congress's power to vest that authority in subordinates). 
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do not cooperate with such directives.193 Under this theory, 
Humphrey's Executor was wrongly decided because a statute that 
limits the President's removal to specified "cause" would interfere 
with his core executive functions. If the Take Care Clause is 
construed as creating presidential power to direct how the laws are 
executed, the PCAOB may be problematic because neither the SEC 
nor the President retain the power under the Act to direct the day-to-
day operation of PCAOB inspections, investigations, or enforcement 
actions.194 The plaintiffs in Free Enterprise Fund advanced this 
viewpoint, arguing that "the President must retain the exclusive 
removal authority over those executing the laws,,,195 which extends 
well beyond Cabinet-level officials to "'the lowest officers, the 
middle grade, and the highest.' ,,196 
Other theorists argue that the President can express discontent 
with principal officers by removing them-either for their own 
misconduct or for mismanagement of inferior officers or employees-
but lacks the authority to direct the exercise of their discretion. 197 
Under this theory of executive power, the framers envisioned some 
measure of separation between the President and other executive 
officials, from whom he could seek guidance but who exercise a 
degree of independent discretion.198 Accordingly, the Take Care 
Clause empowers the President to make sure that the executive 
193. Miller, supra note 1, at 44. This theory of executive power is more than a purely 
academic exercise in the conceivable. As Harold Krent has observed, President George 
W. Bush's "centralization efforts, even in routine administrative matters, have stretched 
our understanding of the unitary executive almost beyond recognition." Harold J. Krent, 
From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 524 (2008); cf Lessig & 
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2, 40 ("[T]he view that the framers constitutionalized anything 
like [the unitary executive] is a myth .... [T]he framers meant to constitutionalize just 
some of what we now think of as 'executive power,' leaving the balance to Congress to 
structure as it thought proper."). 
194. See 15 U.S.c. § 7211(c) (2006) (giving the Board authority to direct day-to-day 
inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions). This tension figured prominently in 
Free Enterprise Fund, with the dissenting judge arguing that the President's Article II 
powers afford him the constitutional prerogative to direct the exercise of the PCAOB's 
discretion and to remove Board members for noncompliance. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 
at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
195. Brief of Appellants, supra note 85, at 15 (emphasis added). 
196. [d. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 499 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, D.C., 
Gales & Seaton 1834) (remarks of Madison)). 
197. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (describing 
three models of the unitary executive, the weakest of which recognizes the President's 
power to remove principal officers at will but maintains that his subordinates' exercise of 
discretionary executive power remains valid until revoked by a successor). 
198. See id. 
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branch officers do not flout or ignore the law-that they execute it 
faithfully-but it is not an independent source of presidential 
power. 199 Because the President would not be entitled to fire an 
official for failure to exercise his or her discretion in a desired 
manner, a statute that bars the President from removing officers on 
such grounds is constitutional under this narrower conception of 
executive power. 
Although Humphrey's Executor comports with a theory of 
executive power that tolerates agency decision making independent 
of presidential oversight, the Court has never clearly defined the 
scope of core executive power to control agency activity. The 
Morrison Court suggested that the independent counsel's authority to 
"exercise[] no small amount of discretion and judgment in deciding 
how to carry out ... her duties under the Act" did not constitutionally 
require unfettered removal power on the part of the President.20o 
Nevertheless, the Court was fundamentally persuaded that, because 
the independent counsel could be controlled indirectly through the 
Attorney General, the statute did not impermissibly infringe on 
executive power.201 In theory, the foregoing passage from Morrison 
means that that the President constitutionally possesses directory 
authority, but the statute did not interfere with it. It is equally 
possible that the President lacks such authority, so the statute's 
impact on his ability to direct agency officials' discretion is irrelevant. 
The Court did not identify the premise underlying its rhetoric. 
Because the PCAOB is not controlled by a principal officer who-
like the Attorney General-can be removed at will by the President, 
the question remains whether endowing removal authority on 
someone whom the President could only fire for cause would 
"interfere" with his core functions. And that question cannot be 
answered without first identifying what core functions belong to the 
President, which Morrison failed to do. 
Richard Pierce offers a possible definition of "core functions" by 
suggesting a policy making definition of executive power: "It seems 
near certain that the framers intended the politically accountable 
branches to make all policy decisions except those incident to the 
process of adjudicating cases under the Constitution, statutes, and the 
199. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 275 (2003) (describing the Take Care Clause as imposing a duty 
rather than as conferring power). 
200. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
201. See id. at 671-72. 
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common law.,,202 Without rejecting "for cause" limitations on the 
President's removal power, therefore, he argues that" 'cause' must 
include failure to comply with any valid policy decision made by the 
President or his agent."203 As a consequence, the President could not 
remove an independent counsel for having unearthed politically 
damaging evidence, but could do so for violating a generally 
applicable policy established by the President or his agents. This 
policymaking thesis is consistent with Morrison, in which the Court 
highlighted that the independent counsel's authority did "not include 
any authority to formulate policy for the Government or the 
Executive Branch. ,,204 
Although the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund condemned the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in part because the PCAOB enjoys broad 
authority to promulgate rules, among other things,205 the PCAOB 
may well pass muster under a policymaking standard. While it has the 
authority to promulgate rules, the rules are subject to SEC review.z°6 
In this way, it operates like a negotiating committee that drafts a 
proposed rule for SEC Commissioners' consideration-the SEC is 
ultimately responsible for the policy choice once the rule is 
finalized.207 There is no mechanism for judicial review of the 
PCAOB's failure to regulate,208 but nothing constrains the SEC from 
promulgating rules itself to fill such gaps. And even though the 
PCAOB's investigatory and prosecutorial decisions are largely 
202. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure 
of Government, 1988 SUP. Cr. REV. 1,24. 
203. [d. at 25; cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 118 ("[A] removal standard 
would be unconstitutional if it ... entirely eliminated presidential control over general 
policy decisions. "). 
204. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. Other scholars sharply dispute the notion that the 
substantive hallmark of executive power is policymaking. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, 
supra note 197, at 1170 (discussing the competing view that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to divest the President of executive power); Lee S. Liberman, 
Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. 
REV. 313, 324 (1989) (suggesting that the President is obliged to adhere to prior policy 
decisions under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution). 
205. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 704-05 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("PCAOB members have extraordinarily 
broad power under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to, among other things, promulgate 
rules, initiate and conduct investigations and inspections, compel testimony, and impose 
sanctions."), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
206. 15 U.S.c. § 7217(b)(2) (2006) ("No rule of the Board shall become effective 
without prior approval of the Commission .... "). 
207. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.c. §§ 561-570a (2006). 
208. Compare 15 U.S.c. § 7211(a)-(b) (2006) (declaring the PCAOB "not ... an 
agency"), with 5 U.S.c. §§ 701, 706(1) (providing that judicial review applies only to 
statutorily-defined "agenc[ies]"), and 5 U.S.c. § 706(2) (same). 
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immune from judicial review, law enforcement functions do not 
involve policymaking. If the independent counsel is not making policy 
by investigating and prosecuting under federal criminal laws, in other 
words, the PCAOB is not doing so in policing compliance with 
auditing standards for accountants. Perhaps, therefore, the Act's 
provisions for SEC review of the Board's rulemaking save it from 
serious constitutional challenge under a policymaking definition of 
"core functions." Ironically, this standard turns the one relatively 
settled definition of executive power on its head: because traditional 
law enforcement does not involve policymaking, the President's 
authority to remove the Attorney General and senior prosecutors 
could, in theory, be confined to "cause." Of course, neither Morrison 
nor prior cases on appointment and removal endorsed "for cause" 
limits on the President's power to remove Cabinet-level officials such 
as the Attorney General. A policymaking explication of core 
executive functions, therefore, would not resolve the definitional 
problems Morrison left bare. 
3. Does Limited Removal Power Interfere with a "Core Function"? 
Practicality and Efficiency Concerns 
Even assuming a definition of "core functions," Morrison leaves 
no clear standard for identifying whether a given scheme 
impermissibly "interferes" with those functions. The Court did accept 
that investigation and prosecution are quintessentially executive 
functions but found that the independent counsel scheme did not 
impermissibly interfere with them because the President retained 
some indirect control (through the Attorney General) over removal 
of the independent counseP09 If an inferior officer is not supervised 
or removable by the Attorney General or a Cabinet-level equivalent, 
then, does that render the President's core functions compromised? 
Morrison provides no obvious means of answering that question. 
Wherever the boundary for impermissible interference lies, Morrison 
merely teaches that the independent counsel statute did not cross it.210 
One way to get at the meaning of "interference" without arriving 
at a definitive understanding of "core executive functions" is to 
consider the constitutional purpose behind a single-headed executive 
branch. The Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II reflect a 
well-documented decision by the framers of the Constitution to vest 
209. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695-96 (1988). 
21Q [d. at 696-97. 
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all executive responsibilities in one person rather than a committee.211 
As the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund observed, "[a] single head of 
the Executive Branch enhances efficiency and energy in the 
administration of the Government," regardless of the breadth or 
narrowness of executive power.212 Thus, as an addendum to the core 
functions test, one might look to whether limitations on the 
President's power to appoint and remove officials undermine the 
efficiency rationale behind the unitary executive embodied in the 
Constitution. As with the core functions test itself, however, 
practicality and efficiency concerns do not provide a workable test for 
identifying the limits of congressional authority to create agencies 
that operate independent of presidential control. 
The efficiency rationale for preserving presidential at-will 
removal authority made more sense in 1787 than it does today.213 In 
modern times, the very goal of efficiency borders on the spurious in 
light of the gargantuan administrative bureaucracy, which has 
increased dramatically in size and scope over the past century.214 
Accompanying the expansion of the administrative state, moreover, 
has been the analogous increase in the size of the bureaucracy in and 
around the White House itselp15 The number of political employees 
within the White House has increased ten-fold over the last forty 
years and four-fold over the last decade.216 When viewed against the 
211. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional 
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 62, 72 (1990); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative 
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967 (2001); see also Miller, supra 
note 1, at 70 (discussing the rejection of the council idea at the Constitutional 
Convention). 
212. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 689 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). In addition to serving 
the values of efficiency and accountability (discussed below), the unitary executive fosters 
coordination, avoids factionalism, and enables the President to act with dispatch. Lessig 
and Sun stein, supra note 32, at 94-95. 
213. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies, 
36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 509-10 (1987) (observing that the President oversees modern 
agencies but cannot participate in all subordinates' decisions). 
214. See David C. Via deck, Commentary, The Administrative Conference's Role in 
Promoting Government Efficiency Today, Tomorrow, and Next Year, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U. 697, 698 (1994) ("[T]he need to simplify and streamline the nation's administrative 
state has only increased in recent years."). 
215. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who 
Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive, By Steven G. Calabresi 
and Christopher Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CaNST. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manuscript on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). 
216. Id. (manuscript at 19) (citing PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 
164 (2007)). 
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thousands of appointed officials and federal employees within the 
numerous executive and independent agencies that comprise the 
broader administrative bureaucracy, the White House seems 
miniscule in comparison. Yet "[i]t is simply impossible for the 
president to control the White House, much less the bureaucracy."217 
As Richard Pierce explains: 
There are not enough hours in the day for the president to be 
aware of more than a tiny fraction of the policy decisions that 
are made by agencies every day. Moreover, the chain of agency 
relationships between the president and the people who 
actually make policy decisions in the bureaucracy is far too long 
to indulge the assumption that everyone in the White House 
who purports to speak for the president is acting consistently 
with the president's policy preferences.218 
Thus, although there are virtues-rooted in the Constitution-to 
having a single leader who brings policy in line with a set of principles 
on which the President was elected, as a practical matter this 
justification for unfettered appointment and at-will removal authority 
only goes so far. 
Notwithstanding the elusiveness of efficiency as a goal for 
executive administration, practicality is a troubling basis for 
marginalizing the unitary executive theory that animates Article II. 
Presumably, avoidance of fractious executive control is partly why the 
framers left it to the President alone to appoint principal officers, and 
why the cluster of people who populate that category might be 
expanded-if anything-rather than narrowed with the swelling of 
the administrative state. The fact that the President cannot effectively 
orchestrate along a single note the entire federal bureaucracy is a 
poor reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater. He certainly 
can connect with a key group of officers who work at his pleasure. 
Under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, however, the 
independent agency model enables' Congress to configure 
substantively powerful agencies "independent" of the President so 
long as a layer of bureaucracy cushions officials from presidential 
control.219 This construction of the legislative power stands in tension 
with the unitary executive model the framers envisioned. 
217. [d. (manuscript at 16). 
218. /d. 
219. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text. 
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To be sure, one purpose of the early independent agency was to 
frustrate presidential controI.220 Its existence, therefore, forces a 
choice between the efficient administration of a unitary executive and 
the virtues of agency independence. Morrison accepts the 
consequence that under some circumstances, it is appropriate to 
compromise efficiency values for the benefit of something greater. 
The question then becomes: what values are sufficiently important to 
trump the need for the efficient administration of executive 
government? There is no easy way to concoct a framework for 
analysis that produces a clear answer to this question-it is again 
ultimately unsatisfying because it seems too subjective. 
One possibility is to consider the historical justification for 
independent agencies: the corrosive effect of politics on the 
democratically-responsive operation of government. Morrison 
occurred in the wake of the Watergate scandal.221 The idea behind the 
independent counsel law was to avoid a repeat of the so-called 
"Saturday Night Massacre" whereby President Nixon dismissed 
special prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was appointed by the 
Attorney General.222 The perceived need to ensure effective 
investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing at the highest levels of 
government, in other words, outweighed the efficiency rationale for a 
unitary executive that would no doubt be undermined by the 
independent counsel law. This idea probably made sense at the time. 
Because no President is above the law, no President should dictate 
investigations into his own conduct; were he to do so, it would hardly 
facilitate the efficient operation of the executive branch as a whole. 
220. In its seminal decision validating the appointment and removal structure of the 
FIC, therefore, the Supreme Court considered the "coercive influence" of presidential 
removal power a threat to agencies' ability to act with independence. Humphrey's Ex'r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602,630 (1935). As Geoffrey Miller has observed, "[t]he case was 
decided in the thick of the bitter battle over the constitutionality of the New Deal [and] 
may well have reflected reservations about the danger of overwhelming presidential 
power-a concern that had not inconsiderable force during the early days of the Roosevelt 
Administration." Miller, supra note 1, at 94. Later, the Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the War Claims Commission, which was established to hear certain claims 
arising out of World War II because that body was designed to be "entirely free from the 
control or coercive influence" of the President and to adjudicate claims strictly "according 
to law." Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,355 (1958). 
221. See George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us-Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and 
Two Views of the Anti-Corruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 804-07 (2000) (describing 
events giving rise to the independent counsel statute and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Morrison). 
222. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
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The independent counsel statute, however, was not renewed.223 Not 
only did the investigations drag on for dubious benefit at enormous 
cost to the taxpayers, but in hindsight it became evident that the 
public outcry over President Nixon's actions and the scrutiny imposed 
by the press operated to bring down the President regardless of 
whether Cox stayed in office.224 The need for a truly independent 
prosecutor may have been largely illUSory. Whether independent 
agencies in fact operate as they were intended-that is, divorced from 
political influence and driven by facts and science versus loyalty to 
the current White House occupant-is similarly debatable.225 . 
Even assuming arguendo that independence from the President 
does ensure objective policymaking by executive branch 
subordinates, it cannot be denied that such independence comes at a 
cost. The cost, of course, is presidential power and unitary control. 
The argument for independence is, by its very nature, at odds with the 
conclusion that the President wields control over independent 
agencies. Although the Court long-ago established that "for cause" 
limitations on the President's removal power are an acceptable price 
to pay for independence,226 it has laid no viable groundwork for 
determining when the price becomes too high. 
Congress conceived of the PCAOB as peculiarly independent. Its 
independence is uniquely fortified by the "double for-cause" 
structure for removal of its members. There is no evidence that 
Congress had the Appointments Clause and removal precedent in 
mind when, in the words of Senator Gramm, it endowed the Board 
with "massive power, unchecked power, by design," for use in 
"mak[ing] decisions that affect all accountants and everybody they 
work for, which directly or indirectly is every breathing person in this 
country.,,227 Once the inherent tension between independence and 
presidential control is acknowledged, it becomes difficult to argue 
persuasively that the need for independence trumps fidelity to the 
223. See Stephan O. Kline, Heal It, Don't Bury It! Testimony on Reauthorization of the 
Independent Counsel Act, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51, 56-67 ("[S]ome commentators 
suggest that the firing of Archibald Cox shows that the prosecutorial system functioned 
perfectly well before the 1978 law came into existence."); cf Stack, supra note 148, at 440 
("Independent Counsel Starr's investigation turned the political tables on the independent 
counsel statute."). 
224. See Stack, supra note 148, at 409 ("[W]hile the Watergate special prosecutor 
model allowed politics to trump legal process in the short term, it was not without political 
accountability for President Nixon."). 
225. See supra note 49. 
226. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
227. 148 CONGo REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
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principle of a unitary executive. Nothing in the Constitution compels 
the former. Yet the latter arises from historical records 
contemporaneous to the Constitution228 and implicit in Article II 
itself: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America."229 Thus, the argument that presidential 
appointment and at-will removal power is necessary to ensure 
efficient coordination of the executive branch is a valid one. 
The efficiency rationale for a unitary executive extends well 
beyond the novelties of the PCAOB, however, and bears upon the 
propriety of independent agencies per se. There is not much to be 
gained, therefore, in employing it as a standard for testing future 
iterations of the independent agency model. Under prevailing case 
law, it is hard to make the argument that restraints on presidential 
removal and appointment power interfere with the efficiency 
objective of a unitary executive. Independent agencies are here to 
stay. The Court has repeatedly tolerated curtailment of the 
President's at-will removal power.230 A retreat from these authorities 
based on an argument that the efficiency benefits of a unitary 
executive must be protected could not be accomplished without 
substantial retraction of precedents that have been in place for over 
three-quarters of a century. 
Moreover, even if an efficient executive branch were the driving 
objective behind the question of interference with core presidential 
functions,231 scholars debate whether removal plays a meaningful role 
in ensuring agency adherence to the President's agenda.232 The 
President exercises control over agency bureaucracy in ways that 
might satisfy Morrison's core functions test even if a statute 
completely separates him from the locus of removal power. A string 
of executive orders have long authorized the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Analysis ("OIRA") within the President's Office of 
Management and Budget ("OMB") to monitor agency compliance 
228. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1385, 1406-07 (2008) (discussing views of Hamilton and Madison supporting a 
unitary executive). 
229. U.S. CONST. art. II (emphasis added). 
230. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text. 
231. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). 
232. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13-17) (arguing that most executive 
branch officers are incentivized to act in a manner consistent with the President's 
objectives regardless of the removal power, and that "for cause" restrictions on removal 
are unimportant). 
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with various regulatory analysis requirements.233 Moreover, as 
Richard Pierce recently observed, the "[l]argely invisible ad hoc 
White House jawboning is now, and always has been, far more 
important in its impact on agency policy decisions."234 A phone call 
from Vice President Cheney to a relatively low-level agency 
appointee prompted shifts in policy decisions during the Bush 
Administration that rippled to the upper echelons of the agency.235 
And even absent a statutory obstacle to removal power, the political 
costs of removing a presidential appointee can be too high to 
entertain.236 President Nixon's removal of Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson ultimately led to the end of his presidency.237 Given these 
other means of influencing agency activity, the President's "core 
functions" might not be impeded even if his removal power were 
"completely stripped" with respect to a certain officer.238 
At bottom, the Court's historical approach to the question of the 
constitutionality of independent agencies has been ad hoc and 
outcome determinative. It lacks any guiding theoretical principle that 
might withstand the idiosyncrasies of the modern regulatory state. In 
this regard, the "core executive functions" rhetoric of Morrison is 
misleading. The Court failed to define core executive functions or 
provide standards for recognizing when legislation impermissibly 
interferes with them. To the extent that some limiting principles 
exist-such as consideration of the purposes behind a unitary 
executive, the President's policy-making role, or the classic executive 
functions of investigation and prosecution-the facts of Morrison 
deprive them of any real force. As a result, litigants seeking to 
challenge or defend legislation establishing an unprecedented agency 
structure are largely left to distinguish the facts of Morrison, that is, 
how the specifics of new legislation compare to the challenged 
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The dissent in Free 
233. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 c.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 4 U.S.C. § 601 
(1988); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 
13,422,72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). See Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13). 
234. Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13); see also Lisa Bressman & Michael 
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of 
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 69-70 (2008) (concluding that various White 
House offices and the OIRA attempted to control rulemaking at EPA). 
235. See Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 14) (discussing Jo Becker & Barton 
Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at Al (describing the 
Department of Interior's reversal of the decision regarding dam operation after Vice 
President Cheney communicated with the nineteenth ranking person at the agency)). 
236. Id. (manuscript at 9) (discussing the high cost of exercising removal power). 
237. Id. 
238. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). 
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Enterprise Fund struggled mightily to demonstrate, for example, that 
the independent counsel's tenure was limited in duration and that the 
SEC is less susceptible to presidential control than the Attorney 
Genera1.239 Hinging the constitutionality of the Act on such features 
seems patternless and subjective; that Morrison demands such an 
analysis is a testament to its failure to replace the obsolete "quasi-" 
approach of Humphrey's Executor with a meaningful constitutional 
standard. Because Congress will continue to experiment with new 
agency forms, the Court should derive a workable standard from 
enduring constitutional principles rather than tinker at the margins of 
the elusive meaning of executive power. 
C. The Promising-but Incomplete-Presidential Accountability 
Concept 
A possible alternative to the core functions test would consider 
the constitutionality of independent agencies from an important 
structural premise implicit in the Constitution: officers within the 
executive branch are accountable to the public through the President. 
In his famous opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council,240 Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that, 
"[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is. ,,241 A "presidential accountability" approach sidesteps 
the thorny definition of core executive functions while serving up a 
broad principle from which a meaningful standard might be derived. 
As with an approach to core executive functions that closely tethers 
the President to the powers of investigation, prosecution, or policy 
making, or strives to serve the efficiency justification for a unitary 
executive, however, a test that looks exclusively to an agency's 
accountability to the President cannot operate alone within existing 
doctrine. 
A presidential accountability approach would build on the 
Supreme Court's premise that "one who holds his office only during 
the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an 
attitude of independence against the latter's will. ,,242 If an officer 
239. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 708--09 
n.17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 2378 (2009). The dissenting opinion was not particularly persuasive on these points. 
See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
240. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
241. Id. at 865. 
242. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); see Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) (noting that the Appointments Clause was "designed to preserve 
political accountability"); see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) 
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understands that the President can fire her at any point for any 
reason, she will strive to conform to the President's directives and 
agenda for fear of losing her job.243 Reciprocally, the President is 
responsible to the electorate for the successes and failures of such an 
"alter ego" in effectuating the platform on which he was elected. If 
the President is too far removed from that official's chain of 
command, he cannot reasonably be held accountable for the official's 
mistakes. 
The Board is exceedingly remote from electoral accountability. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act affords the President no power to appoint 
and remove Board members.244 The recipient of such power-the 
SEC-is not democratically elected. The Act would thus be 
susceptible to challenge under a presidential accountability approach. 
Because the Court appeared satisfied in Humphrey'S Executor 
and Morrison that affording the President only indirect removal 
power does not per se render the government actor unaccountable, 
the question raised by a presidential accountability approach is how 
much independence is too much. This question may be hard to 
answer by looking simply at the length of the chain of command to 
the President. The SEC is effectively in charge of the PCAOB and 
exercises greater oversight than the Attorney General exercised 
under the independent counsel statute.245 But the Act creating the 
PCAOB is distinguishable from the independent counsel statute 
because the SEC-unlike the Attorney General-is not removable at 
will.246 There is certainly a more tenuous accountability track under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and no method under prevailing law for 
determining when that track becomes too lengthy. The Morrison 
Court hung its hat on a finding of "inferior" status:247 if the PCAOB is 
inferior, it follows, the question of presidential removal melts away. 
But such a technical holding obscures the very real dilemma posed by 
the PCAOB. The idea behind presidential control is a fundamentally 
democratic one: if the President appoints and the agency makes 
("The power to remove officers ... is a powerful tool for control."); see Strauss, supra note 
16, at 58 (deriving accountability requirement from Edmond); supra note 169. 
243. But see supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (discussing debate over 
whether removal actually operates to ensure agency compliance with the President's 
agenda). 
244. 15 U.S.c. § 7211(e)(4) (2006) (providing that the SEC will appoint Board 
members). 
245. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, eert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
246. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
247. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,691-92 (1988). 
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mistakes, the voters can hold the President accountable for the alter 
ego's misdeeds. Such accountability is missing under the Act because 
the SEC is unelected, and no single President is realistically 
responsible for appointing all of its members.248 
The executive, moreover, is the only democratically-elected 
branch that can hold officials accountable through the power of 
removal under Supreme Court case law involving congressional 
attempts to reserve removal power for itself. Congress cannot 
participate in the appointment or removal of officials charged with 
executing the law except by impeachment.249 The Court thus took 
care in Morrison to provide reassurance that the independent counsel 
law "d[id] not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in 
the removal of executive officials other than its established powers of 
impeachment and conviction. ,,250 
Ostensibly, Congress made no attempt in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act to afford itself any unconstitutional influence in the removal of 
Board members. On the one hand, then, the inquiry as to whether the 
statute expressly aggrandizes congressional power at the President's 
expense supports the conclusion that the Act is constitutional. The 
power to remove Board members lies exclusively with the SEC. 
On the other hand, the Act should fail under a presidential 
accountability approach precisely because no democratically elected 
branch of government can remove Board members. Whereas 
Congress is constitutionally forbidden from involving itself in the 
248. Moreover, as Part III, infra, explains, the notion of separation of powers is 
premised on a balancing of powers between the three primary branches. Here, the 
"balance" is provided by an independent hybrid entity-the SEC. There is no pretense 
that the President exercises the real power here. The SEC does. But the idea that balance 
derives from some quasi-executive entity that is only marginally responsible to the 
President distracts from the basic concept of three separated powers. 
249. Myers v. United States involved a statute which provided that certain postmasters 
could be removed only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 272 U.S. 52, 
106 (1925). The President removed a postmaster unilaterally, and a lawsuit followed. The 
Court declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that for Congress to "draw to 
itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the 
exercise of that power ... would be ... to infringe the constitutional principle of the 
separation of governmental powers." [d. at 161. The Court applied this principle again in 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rebuffing Congress's attempt to control 
spending by appointing the Comptroller General of the United States to monitor 
compliance with spending limitations and vesting removal power in itself). Similarly, in 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132, 137 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected Congress's 
attempt to vest in itself the power to appoint members of the Federal Election 
Commission to the extent that they are charged with tasks that do not merely aid in the 
operation of congressional legislative authority. 
250. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686. 
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removal process, the President's authority is limited to firing certain 
SEC Commissioners for cause for failing to persuade the SEC as a 
whole to fire PCAOB members for cause (assuming that such "cause" 
even encompasses whatever problem the President has with the 
PCAOB's actions). The problem with this argument is that the Court 
has consistently endorsed the constitutionality of agency 
independence from the President.251 If it turns out that the 
Constitution requires a clear line of accountability to the President 
for agency officials, existing "for cause" limitations on the President's 
removal powers become fundamentally suspect to the extent that 
statutory "cause" excludes the act or omission for which the President 
seeks to hold an officer accountable. 
The Court could draw a line at the facts of Morrison and hold 
that independent agencies are tolerable only if their members are 
appointed and removed by the President or a Cabinet-level officer 
who is removable at Will.252 After all, the President's ability to remove 
the Attorney General for any reason rendered the independent 
counsel more accountable to the President than the PCAOB by 
comparison. Such a distinction is somewhat arbitrary, however, as the 
very purpose of the independent counsel statute was to insulate 
prosecution of senior executive officials from presidential control. It 
begs the question of whether removal power is an effective tool for 
ensuring accountability to the President. Thus, although 
accountability is fertile ground on which to plant a seed for an 
alternative framework for assessing limits on the President's 
appointment and removal power, it cannot do the job alone within 
existing doctrine. 
Another analytical thread lies dormant in the aforementioned 
case law barring Congress from retaining removal authority for itself. 
Fundamental separation-of-powers principles-and not the 
aggrandizement of congressional power for its own sake-drove these 
decisions.253 In Bowsher v. Synar,254 the Court rebuffed Congress's 
attempt to control spending by vesting in itself the power to remove 
the Comptroller General of the United States,255 emphasizing that the 
tripartite system "was deliberately so structured ... to provide 
251. See supra Part ILA. 
252. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 60 (observing that the fact that the SEC as a whole is 
responsible for appointment and removal of Board members distinguishes the PCAOB 
from similar entities). 
253. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. 
254. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
255. Id. 
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avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of government 
power.,,256 The ban on congressional removal power thus sprung from 
"'[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three 
general departments of government entirely free from the control or 
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others.' "257 As 
Part III suggests, this bedrock concept of balanced powers should 
prominently inform the propriety of modern attempts by Congress to 
relieve the President of his traditional role in appointing and 
removing independent agency members or commissioners for cause. 
III. TOWARD A REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOVEL INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
STRUCTURES 
This Part seizes upon the theory animating the ban on 
congressional attempts to retain removal authority and suggests that 
courts evaluate modern infringements on the President's appointment 
and removal power from the perspective of a particular facet of 
separation-of-powers theory: ensuring proper checks and balances. 
This framework departs from an accountability approach in one 
significant respect. Rather than look at presidential power in 
isolation, it scrutinizes the posture of a given independent agency 
relative to all three branches of government. The question is, are 
there sufficient checks and balances on the actions of the agency to 
satisfy the conventions of separation of powers theory? By enabling 
meaningful judicial scrutiny of new independent agency forms, such 
an approach could operate to reign in legislative efforts to insulate 
entities exercising executive power from traditional means of 
ensuring accountability without disturbing the viability of existing 
independent agencies. 
The objective here is merely to outline the preliminary features 
of such an approach, beginning with a description of the proposal and 
then applying it to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the process, this Part 
identifies how this alternative method for establishing boundaries on 
Congress's ability to fashion new independent agencies improves 
upon the methods discussed thus far. 
256. [d. 
257. [d. at 725 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 
(1935». 
2009] PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NON-AGENCY 117 
A. A Checks-and-Balances Approach to Appointment and Removal 
Laurence Tribe has remarked that, "to decide major cases," it 
may "be necessary to extrapolate what amounts to a blueprint of 
organizational relationships from the fundamental structural 
postulates one sees as informing the Constitution as a whole."258 As 
argued in Part II, the inherent shortcomings of the approach in 
Morrison highlight a need for an alternative analysis derived from 
general constitutional tenets. Given the limitations of an approach 
that would look exclusively to an agency's structural posture vis-a-vis 
the President, review of entities like the PCAOB would benefit from 
an analysis that borrows from broader principles of separation of 
powers, in particular, the need to ensure sufficient checks and 
balances. 
The doctrine of separation of powers concerns "the distribution 
of powers among the three coequal Branches ... ; it does not speak to 
the manner in which authority is parceled out within a single 
Branch.,,259 Although not express in the Constitution, the doctrine is 
inferred from the document's organizing principles.260 As the 
Supreme Court has explained,261 its purpose is to prevent anyone 
branch from exercising the whole power of another, or from 
exercising the fundamental powers of the government as a whole.262 
The separation of powers presumes some common understanding of 
what activities are appropriate to the legislature, the courts, and the 
President, but contains no immutable rules; it "is a structural 
safeguard, or prophylactic device" that is, by design, "sufficiently 
flexible to permit practical arrangements in a complex 
government. "263 
The important separation-of-powers flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is not that the statute diminishes presidential power in favor of a 
coordinate branch of government. After all, the power holder under 
the Act is another independent agency-the SEC. Fundamental 
separation-of-powers principles are implicated because the Act 
effectively enables the PCAOB to conduct investigations, inspections, 
and enforcement actions independent of any direct oversight by one 
of the three branches of government, thus rendering it reasonably 
258. TRIBE, supra note 39, at 130. 
259. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1991) (citation omitted). 
260. 16 c.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (2005) (citation omitted). 
261. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935). 
262. 16A AM. JUR. 20 Constitutional Law § 246 (1998). 
263. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 217. 
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accountable to none of them.264 The remaining question is whether 
the doctrine's flexibility tolerates such a diversion from the framers' 
explicit (three-branch) and implicit (designed to preclude 
overreaching by anyone branch) structural plan. 
To address legislative attempts to render agencies increasingly 
independent of the three branches of government, an alternative 
approach to reviewing the constitutionality of unprecedented agency 
forms would turn on one particular aspect of the doctrine-the 
concept of checks and balances. The structure of the Constitution 
operates to diffuse power.265 The separateness of the branches 
"permit[ s] a working interdependence in which each branch, in 
guarding its own prerogatives, effectively checks and balances self-
interested behavior by the other branches."266 In doing so, they 
collectively "protect the governed from arbitrary oppressive acts on 
the part of those in political authority.,,267 As a consequence, the 
separation of powers inherent in the Constitution ensures an order of 
checks and balances.268 As Chaihark Hahm recently explained: 
The idea is that, since power that is left unchecked tends to 
enlarge itself and become arrogant and abusive, a mechanism 
must be set in place to counter that tendency. Power must be 
divided into smaller parts so that it becomes less threatening, or 
it should be counterbalanced by another power of similar size 
and strength so that it does not become larger and stronger. It 
was in this vein that James Madison famously remarked, 
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."269 
Accordingly, if legislation establishing agency independence leaves an 
entity with insufficiently checked power within the tripartite system, it 
may be constitutionally infirm even if it satisfies the porous 
264. See infra Part IILB.2-3. 
265. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D § 247 (explaining that the Constitution prevents 
concentration of power). 
266. Sargentich, supra note 28, at 435. 
267. 16 c.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
616 n.7 (2000)). 
268. [d. § 217 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1989)). 
269. Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler's Legitimacy in 
a Confucian Polity, 57 AM. J. COMPo L. 135, 136 (2009) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 
at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)); see also BERNARD 
BAIL YN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDERS 48 (2003) ("Only structural balances within a government, 
Madison thought, pitting one force against another, could keep the misuse of power in 
check and so protect minority rights."). 
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Appointments Clause framework established by Humphrey's 
Executor and Morrison. 270 
This "checks-and-balances" test of the constitutionality of a 
statute establishing an independent agency has a number of features 
that better accomplish the objective of identifying when Congress has 
gone too far in structuring agencies with independence from the 
President. First, unlike the core functions approach and the variants 
discussed in Part II, it does not focus on executive power per se and is 
therefore not unduly constrained by the facts of Morrison. If 
executive power is analogized to clear water that fills "Beaker One" 
to its brim, in other words, the core functions test would ask whether 
the water in Beaker One has been partially drained by a statute to the 
point where it can no longer serve its intended constitutional purpose. 
So, too, consideration of whether the efficiency justification for a 
unitary executive has been compromised would, by analogy, focus on 
the absolute amount of water in Beaker One. But the question of 
whether the water has been drained to an excessive point begs 
another crucial one: what is the intended purpose and role of the 
water in Beaker One in the first instance? Without an answer to this 
provocative question, the core functions test and the related 
efficiency justification approach falter. 
The presidential accountability approach discussed in Part II is 
also largely concerned with executive power per se. That is, if the 
clear water represents the actual (versus normative) whole of 
executive power, does that power include responsibility for the acts of 
the inferior officer in question? With its "double for-cause" limitation 
on the President's power to remove Board members, and its denial of 
presidential power to appoint them, the answer is likely "no" under 
270. Other scholars have endorsed similar lines of analysis. See Harold J. Krent, The 
Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential Powers: A Reply to Professor Prakash, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1398 (2006) ("In assessing [a] congressional intrusion, courts 
should thus not ask whether the intrusion is reasonable in light of the congressional 
objective, ... nor ask whether the intrusion leaves the Executive with sufficient power to 
attain constitutional objectives, as in Morrison v. Olson. Rather, the Court should first ask 
whether the clash threatens to undermine one of the critical checks and balances in the 
Constitution itself.") (citations omitted); cf Sargentich, supra note 28, at 463 ("[T]he 
matter is so muddled that we should abandon the task, and focus instead on an effort to 
realize the values of checks and balances in the relations between agencies, on the one 
hand, and Congress and the President, on the other hand."); Strauss, supra note 4, at 499 
("Rather than argue that particular relationships (such as the removal power) are 
necessary, the alternative inquiry I suggest would have focused upon the overall 
framework of relationships, a framework whose elements may vary."); Treanor, supra 
note 123, at 997 ("Judges in the Founding era were not textualists when they engaged in 
constitutional interpretation ... [but] acted aggressively to protect the basic constitutional 
boundaries that were not protected by the political process itself."). 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.271 Responsibility for the PCAOB's actions, 
by design, does not evidently lie with the President. Although 
appealing, the problem with the accountability approach is that it 
collides with Morrison. The independent counsel law was enacted to 
remove prosecution of executive branch officials from the purview of 
presidential accountability and control. Technically, the Attorney 
General had removal authority; but for all practical purposes, the 
independent counsel was most certainly not accountable to the 
President.272 
The accountability approach does, however, become useful if 
Beaker One is not viewed in isolation. If Beaker Two contains yellow 
water representing Congress, and Beaker Three contains blue water 
representing the courts, responsibility for the PCAOB resides in 
neither. In effect, the Act requires the addition of another beaker to 
the analogy: Beaker Four representing the SEC. The SEC has no 
constitutionally assigned powers, so Beaker Four is empty. But it still 
reflects the locus of responsibility for the PCAOB's actions. 
Building on the concept of presidential accountability, a checks-
and-balances approach would assess the contents of Beaker One 
relative to those of Beakers Two and Three. In other words, if the 
President does not have the actual power in Beaker One to check the 
Board's activities and hold it accountable for missteps, then either 
Congress or the courts must. This approach does not concern itself in 
the first instance with the question of what absolute powers should be 
housed in each beaker or, if oversight responsibility for the PCAOB 
is shared, in what proportion. It simply requires that mechanisms for 
effective oversight of the PCAOB are lodged in one of the beakers 
containing water. Otherwise, the Act may well fail the test. 
The second distinguishing feature of a checks-and-balances 
approach is that it would enable the Supreme Court to meaningfully 
scrutinize independent agency configurations without disavowing 
prior appointment and removal decisions that operate to protect the 
constitutionality of independent agencies per se.273 As the D.C. 
Circuit majority pointed out in much of Free Enterprise Fund, the 
plaintiffs' Morrison-based challenge to the Act's constitutionality was 
271. 15 U.S.c. § 7211(e)(4), (6) (2006). 
272. See supra Part ILB.1. 
273. See Miller, supra note 1, at 57-58 ("Other things being equal, it would be desirable 
if the rule to be adopted were one that could be squared with the Court's decisions in the 
area."). 
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essentially foreclosed by Humphrey's Executor and its progeny.274 
Under a checks-and-balances approach, the Court could find that the 
traditional independent agency model includes sufficient checks on 
agency behavior while tamping down on legislative attempts to 
increase agency independence. The Court in Humphrey's Executor 
explicitly emphasized, for example, that Congress intended the FTC 
to "be independent of executive authority, except in its selection. ,,275 
Thus, the President's ability to appoint and remove independent 
agency officials presents a critical distinction between the SEC and 
the PCAOB under a checks-and-balances approach to the Act's 
constitutionality. 
Nor does Humphrey's Executor's tolerance of "for cause" 
limitations on the President's removal power foreclose a finding that 
sufficient checks and balances exist under the traditional independent 
agency model. "For cause" limitations have persisted for decades, yet 
Presidents have not complained of an impaired ability to manage 
independent agencies.276 Although a President cannot remove most 
board members or commissioners for any reason, "cause" generally 
encompasses those of greatest concern, such as inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or outright malfeasance.277 Morrison does not hold to the 
contrary. The Court at least implied that some level of control 
through the President's chain of command is a constitutional 
imperative.278 And, in fact, the independent counsel was subject to 
legislative, judicial, and executive checks on the exercise of undue 
power. She was removable for cause by the Attorney General (a 
Cabinet-level principal officer), her tenure was terminable by the 
special court responsible for her appointment, her activities were 
subject to congressional oversight, and her prosecutorial decisions 
274. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) ("The bulk of the Fund's challenge to the Act was fought-and lost-over 
seventy years ago when the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Executor."), reh'g en 
bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
275. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935). 
276. See Miller, supra note 1, at 84 ("If a practice of government has persisted for many 
years without significant controversy, then this is evidence that the practice is 
constitutional, or has become so by prescription. "). 
277. Geoffrey Miller has observed that "[m]any statutes creating independent agencies 
do not clearly set forth the kinds of actions that constitute 'cause' justifying removal by the 
President," while others "set forth a detailed list of the actions that justify removal." [d. at 
86-87 (citations omitted). 
278. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 113 ("The notion of 'inferior' implies the 
existence of a superior, and a truly independent counsel-that is, one not at all 
controllable by the Attorney General or the President-would have no superior."). 
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were susceptible to judicial review under conventional criminal law 
principles.279 
Third, a checks-and-balances analysis acknowledges the 
complexities of the modern administrative state and thus affords 
Congress flexibility in crafting new agency forms. The dissenting D.C. 
Circuit judge in Free Enterprise Fund suggested a clear threshold for 
the constitutionality of independent agencies that would require 
Congress to lodge appointment and removal power with the 
President or his alter ego, that is, someone whom the President can 
fire at Will.280 A "President or alter ego-only" standard for 
appointment and removal of independent agency officials would 
categorically reject the notion that, as a matter of separation of 
powers, Congress may have good reason to protect a future entity 
from such (albeit indirect) presidential oversight. This may be entirely 
appropriate. Yet as commentators have observed, the administration 
of President George W. Bush was characterized by an expansive view 
of executive power that brought theory into practice and, in the view 
of many, led to widespread abuses.281 If permanently ensconced in 
American politics and constitutional doctrine, the Bush theory of the 
unitary executive could require a rebalancing of power within the 
administrative state to foster objective and reasoned decision-making 
on the part of agency officials. Because a President or alter ego-only 
standard assumes that minor adjustments to the PCAOB model 
would never be good policy, it should be embraced only upon careful 
consideration of its cost: the luxury of legislative adaptation that gave 
birth to the independent agency in the first place. 
Finally, instead of looking to removal as the key mechanism for 
ensuring agency accountability to the public, a checks-and-balances 
approach considers a full menu of mechanisms for scrutinizing and 
penalizing overreaching and incompetence on the part of 
independent agency officials and asks whether those provided in 
given legislation, taken together, operate to sufficiently cabin agency 
behavior. A checks-and-balances model would thus enable Congress 
to continue its quest for agency independence without the 
279. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (citing pertinent provisions of the 
independent counsel statute). 
280. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2378 (2009). 
281. Charlie Savage & Neil A. Lewis, Release of Memos Fuels Push for Inquiry into 
Bush's Terror-Fighting Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2009, at A18; see also supra note 193 
and accompanying text (describing Bush's extreme unitary-executive position). 
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unwavering "green light" to create novel independent agencies that 
existing doctrine appears to afford it. Courts would look to whether 
the branches of government are collectively positioned to 
meaningfully "check" the excesses of the independent entity in 
question. Such an approach keeps faith with the most fundamental 
goals of the framers' original scheme-regardless of whether a 
mechanical application of Appointments Clause precedent allows for 
independent officials to operate beyond the President's meaningful 
control. 
B. Structural Constraints and the PCAOB 
This section proceeds from the premise set forth in Part II-that 
the Court's appointment and removal jurisprudence has drained 
Article II of its heft in restraining congressional attempts to render 
independent agencies even more independent. It then applies a 
checks-and-balances approach to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creating 
the PCAOB, and suggests that the tools for PCAOB oversight that 
exist under the statute are insufficient. Instead, SEC oversight 
coupled with other traditional oversight mechanisms, such as judicial 
review, would go a long way toward ensuring proper checks on 
PCAOB activity. 
1. Checks on Agencies 
A checks-and-balances standard for reviewing the 
constitutionality of novel independent agency structures requires in 
the first instance some coalescence around what mechanisms exist for 
agency oversight. Collectively, such mechanisms enhance the 
separation of powers by safeguarding an important structural interest 
protected by the Appointments Clause: accountability.282 Under a 
checks-and-balances approach to the constitutionality of independent 
agencies, these structural interests may be satisfied by a variety or 
combination of oversight tools grounded in the three-branch system. 
The first of such tools is appointment by the President. William 
Howard Taft once stated that "one of the functions which in a 
practical way gives the President more personal influence than any 
other is that of appointments. "283 Appointment is one way in which 
the President implements the goals of his administration. Congress, in 
282. A checks-and-balances approach would not necessarily operate to protect other 
structural interests of the Appointments Clause, such as ensuring coordination and 
uniformity within the executive branch. 
283. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFf, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POWERS 55 (1916). 
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turn, has the power to either consent to or reject presidential 
appointments, which "can be used as leverage over related and even 
completely unrelated areas in which the Senate has an interest in the 
execution of the laws.,,284 
Second is the President's reciprocal removal power. By posing 
the threat of removal, the President operates as a check on potential 
malfeasance by those who he appointed. The threat of impeachment 
by Congress, to a lesser extent, also serves this objective.285 
Third is the power of the purse. Congress must appropriate to 
agencies the money they need to operate. If members of the 
democratically-elected Congress perceive dysfunction or wrongdoing 
on the part of an agency, legislators can exert influence by 
legislatively specifying how funding may or may not be spent.286 
Moreover, the President prepares an annual budget.287 Most agencies 
must have their budgets approved by OMB,288 which oversees and 
coordinates the President's procurement, financial management, 
information, and regulatory policies. The process enables the 
President to enforce his program priorities by restraining agency 
spending and monitoring performance.289 Hence, control of the purse 
strings plays a substantial role in administrative oversight, and it is 
exercised by both Congress and the President.29o 
Congress has additional tools at its disposal to check agency 
excesses. These include, fourth, the power to hold investigative 
hearings to bring public scrutiny to agency activities. Congress has 
conducted investigations of malfeasance since the 1790s.291 After the 
House of Representatives empowered the Committee on 
Manufacturers to "send for persons and papers" relating to tariff 
legislation in 1827, both houses have considered it their right to 
summon anyone, whether inside or outside the government, to 
284. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 111 
(2006). 
285. Jack Beermann explains that executive officials are rarely threatened with 
impeachment "because they can usually be removed by the President or some other 
supervisory federal official." [d. at 112. 
286. id. at 85-90 (explaining that Congress can influence federal agencies through 
appropriation riders or by threatening to withhold funds). 
287. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18,42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 31 U.S.c.). 
288. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 92. 
289. [d. 
290. id. 
291. Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the 
Privilege Against Compelled Self-incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2458-59 (2002). 
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testify.292 Congress established the General Accountability Office to 
conduct investigations and engage in general oversight of the 
executive branch.293 The very anticipation of public testimony may be 
enough to prompt unelected officials to make adjustments to agency 
priorities, policies, or programs. 
Fifth, both Congress and the President supervise agencies 
informally. This form of oversight "takes a variety of forms, including 
cajoling, adverse publicity ... [and] informal contacts with agency 
members and staff."294 Congress, accordingly, may achieve desired 
administrative outcomes by merely threatening to take legislative 
action, thereby shortcutting the legislative process.295 
Sixth, Congress can legislatively amend the statute that gives an 
agency its powers to enhance statutory oversight mechanisms, to 
constrict agency authority,296 or to abolish the agency entirely.297 It 
may also pass legislation approving particular agency action 
notwithstanding pending litigation298 or setting forth burdensome 
reporting or certification requirements.299 Under the Congressional 
Review Act ("CRA"),300 for example, agencies must submit proposed 
rules to Congress along with a cost-benefit analysis, and Congress 
may legislatively reject them within a specified time frame.30l 
Although Congress possesses this power without the CRA, the 
statute gives it advance notice of proposed rules and an expedited 
procedure for overriding them?02 Other statutes contain "sunset 
292. Howard R. Sklamberg, Investigation Versus Prosecution: The Constitutional Limits 
on Congress's Power to Immunize Witnesses, 78 N.C. L. REV. 153, 182-83 & n.191 (1999). 
In 1857, Congress provided that reluctant witnesses could be held in contempt and tried by 
the federal courts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,207 n.45 (1957). 
293. Beermann, supra note 284, at 128. 
294. !d. at 70. 
295. Id. at 68. 
296. The Senate must also concur with the President's exercise of his power to make 
treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, and "may attach conditions to the ratification to force 
interpretation or application of the treaty in a particular direction" or later "pass 
legislation that is inconsistent with the treaty or that, in effect, prevents the President from 
carrying out the treaty." Beermann, supra note 284, at 77. 
297. See Beermann, supra note 284, at 108 ("Dissatisfaction with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service's performance, for example, led Congress to abolish that agency 
and reallocate its functions among agencies within the Department of Justice, where the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") was located, and the new Department of 
Homeland Security. "). 
298. Id. at 68. 
299. Id. at 106-07. 
300. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.c. §§ 801-808 (2006)). 
301. 5 U.S.c. § 801 (2006). 
302. Beermann, supra note 284, at 83-84. 
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provisions" which automatically extinguish legislation after a certain 
period of time unless reauthorized by Congress, thereby incentivizing 
agencies to construe and enforce legislation in a manner that 
maximizes its chances of renewal by a satisfied Congress.303 
Seventh, the President has peremptory powers under the 
Constitution. He can either sign or veto a bill that broadens or 
restricts agency power or independence from the President.304 He also 
has the power to issue pardons contravening criminal convictions 
secured by prosecutors.3°5 
Eighth, Congress has enacted numerous statutes of broad 
applicability, such as the AP A and its Freedom of Information Act 
("FOIA") provisions,306 which impose important procedural 
limitations on agency activity.307 The President plays a role in 
enforcing such legislation, as well: OIRA, a division of OMB, 
administers the Paperwork Reduction Act and thus oversees the 
rulemaking process.308 Presidents on their own initiative have issued 
executive orders providing for additional procedural safeguards on 
agency decision making, although these generally do not extend to 
independent agencies.309 
The importance of the final two mechanisms by which agency 
activity is checked cannot be overstated. The ninth of these is judicial 
review. The APA contains a catch-all provision enabling affected 
parties to challenge both action and inaction by any "agency," as that 
303. Id. at 106. 
304. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (enabling the President to enact or reject legislation 
generally). 
305. Id. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and pardons 
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."). 
306. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.c. § 552 (2006». 
307. See Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 100-01 (2003) (describing core Administrative 
Procedure Act requirements); David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the 
Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1795-99 
(2008) (describing history and basic provisions of the Freedom of Information Act). 
308. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 93. 
309. See Stack, supra note 148, at 410 & n.41 (observing that the Reagan White 
House's decision not to extend the executive order requiring centralized review to 
independent agencies was driven by politics and the desire to avoid a turf battle with 
Congress). Executive Order 12,866 is the latest in a succession of presidential efforts to 
control agency policy making by requiring that "agency rules undergo cost-benefit analysis 
supervised by OMB officials." PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 97. 
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term is defined in the statute.310 Numerous other statutes specific to 
particular agencies contain their own provisions for judicial review.31l 
Tenth, and finally, the media serves an invaluable role in the 
checks-and-balances equation by bringing public attention to abuses 
and malfeasance by government officials. Its ability to do this 
effectively, however, is contingent upon its access to information. 
Although informal, off-the-record communications are central to this 
process, the press's ability to fulfill its societal role in ensuring 
government accountability would be compromised without the 
numerous disclosure statutes that constrain the ability of government 
officials to act in secret. These include most prominently the FOIA,3J2 
the Government in the Sunshine Act,313 the Presidential Records 
Act,314 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.315 
2. Checks on the PCAOB 
As for the PCAOB, too many of the traditional tools for 
ensuring adequate checks and balances appear to be missing. 
The President neither appoints nor removes Board members. 
Although President Bush could have vetoed the Act and preserved 
the measure of presidential removal authority that exists under the 
traditional agency model, he did not.316 
The legislature established the Board to "have succession until 
dissolved by an Act of Congress."317 Congress has broad authority to 
alter its structure, powers, and responsibilities; to call members before 
an oversight hearing; to strengthen the statutory mechanisms for 
oversight of the Board; or to dissolve it entirely.318 Political scientists 
debate whether active congressional hearings provide Congress with a 
310. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2006). 
311. See, e.g., 41 u.s.c. § 609 (2006) (providing judicial review of contract disputes 
between agencies and contractors). Congress has also statutorily granted itself the right to 
intervene in litigation. Beermann, supra note 284, at 112-13 (citing 2 U.S.c. § 288e(a) 
(2000». 
312. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.c. § 552 (2006». 
313. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.c. § 552b (2006». 
314. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as 
amended at U.S.c. §§ 2201-2207 (2006». 
315. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.c. §§ 1-16 (2006». 
316. Vetoes, of course, are politically costly and cause gridlock. In any event, the fact 
that a sitting President chooses not to veto legislation does not render that legislation 
constitutional. 
317. 15 U.S.c. § 7211(a) (2006). 
318. See supra Part I.B. 
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durable check on the actions of agencies319 or whether "the only 
mechanisms that prevent [agencies] from ignoring Congress's goals 
altogether are judicial review and the possibility of further 
legislation. "320 As Jack Beermann has observed, the "sheer number of 
administrative actions and level of technical detail often involved 
make it impossible for Congress to monitor the vast majority of 
administrative actions."321 Congress's ability to influence an agency by 
controlling its budget may be of greater utility.322 Yet Congress 
foreswore it in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,323 under which the Board sets 
its own budget and salaries and funds itself by collecting fees-or a 
"tax"-on publicly traded companies pursuant to rules promulgated 
by the PCAOB.324 
The Act defines the PCAOB in such a way as to exempt it from 
the APA's coverage, providing that "[t]he Board shall not be an 
agency or establishment of the United States Government.,,325 
Documents prepared or received by the Board in cOHnection with 
inspections, investigations, or Board deliberations are exempt from 
disclosure to the public under the FOIA.326 Without FOIA access to 
319. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair "The Broken Branch"?, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 765, 783 (2009). 
320. Beermann, supra note 284, at 65 (citation omitted). 
321. Id. at 99. 
322. See id. at 68, 84. 
323. This is not entirely unusual, however, as "most independent agencies enjoy a 
measure of discretionary authority over matters such as budget, relations with Congress, 
and positions taken in litigation." Miller, supra note 1, at 51. 
324. 15 V.S.c. § 7211(f)(5) (2006). See Carvin et aI., supra note 20, at 207. From its 
funds, Board members and their staff are paid exponentially higher salaries than their 
SEC counterparts-$615,000 for the Board's Chairman in 2007 alone. Nicholas Rummell, 
The SarBOX: Accounting Czar Is a $600,000 Man, FINANCIAL WEEK, Aug. 20, 2007, 
http://www.financialweek.comlarticle/2oo70820IREGI70817024/1002rrOC.This salary 
substantially exceeds those of former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who made 
$154,6oo that year, Lynn Hume, Regulator Salary Gap Widens, BOND BUYER (New 
York), Aug. 16, 2oo7, at 1, and President Bush himself, who was paid approximately 
$400,000, see Bush Paid $221,635 in Taxes for 2007, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2oo8, 
http://www.usatoday.comlmoney/perfiltaxes/2oo8-04-11-bush-taxes_N.htm. The pay of 
PCAOB staff members similarly dwarfs those of career government employees paid on 
the general schedule-{)r GS-scale. See Rummell, supra. 
325. § 7211(b). The APA defines "agency" as "each authority of the Government of 
the United States," with certain exceptions. 5 U.S.c. § 551(1) (2006). 
326. 15 V.S.c. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006) ("[A]II documents and information prepared or 
received by or specifically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employees 
and agents, in connection with an inspection ... or with an investigation under this section 
... shall be exempt from disclosure, in the hands of an agency or establishment of the 
Federal Government, under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.c. § 552 (2006», or 
otherwise, unless and until presented in connection with a public proceeding or 
released .... "). 
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the PCAOB's records, the ability to bring public scrutiny to Board 
malfeasance is hampered. 
The Act is largely silent with respect to whether the PCAOB's 
exercised powers-as well as the SEC's review of the same-may be 
challenged in court. The Act generically contemplates that the 
PCAOB will defend itself in state and federal court, and authorizes 
the Board to do so with SEC approval.327 But it includes no provision 
for judicial review of the Board's actions. This is noteworthy. As 
Peter Strauss has observed, "Congress generally provides rather full 
review of administrative action," and enhanced agency independence 
"suggests a need for greater judicial control than would be 
experienced for an agency more firmly attached to the President.,ms 
Even where available, the scope of judicial review is more 
circumscribed than that which applies to the actions of the SEC 
itself.329 Judicial review of the Board's inspection activity is expressly 
foreclosed. 330 Judicial review of the Board's final rules is only 
available under the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEC Act") if 
those rules were approved by the SEC.33! It is unavailable, however, if 
a party seeks to challenge the PCAOB's failure or refusal to address a 
327. § 7211(f) ("[The Board] shall have the power ... to sue and be sued, complain and 
defend, in its corporate name and through its own counsel, with the approval of the 
Commission, in any Federal, State, or other court. "). 
328. Strauss, supra note 4, at 524-25. 
329. For PCAOB investigations that culminate in sanctions, the Act says nothing about 
review by a federal court, although the judicial review provision of the Securities 
Exchange Act ("SEC Act") does apply to final SEC orders resolving appeals from the 
Board's disciplinary determinations. 15 U.S.c. § 78y(a)(I) (2006) ("A person aggrieved by 
a final order of the Commission ... may obtain review of the order in [an appropriate 
federal Court of Appeals]."). 
330. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(h)(2) (2006) ("Any decision of the Commission with respect to a 
review [of an inspection report] shall not be reviewable under ... [the Securities Exchange· 
Act] ... or deemed to be 'final agency action' for purposes of [APA review]."). 
331. § 78y(b)(I) ("A person adversely affected by a rule of the Commission ... may 
obtain review of this rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he 
resides or has his principal place of business or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by 
filing in such court, within sixty days after the promulgation of the rule, a written petition 
requesting that the rule be set aside."). Section 78y(a)(I) of the Securities Exchange Act 
further provides for judicial review of SEC decisions: 
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to this 
chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the 
entry of the order, a written petition requesting that the order be modified or set 
aside in whole or in part. 
§ 78y(a)(I). 
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regulatory need-including the promulgation of a new rule or the 
amendment or repeal of an existing one.332 
3. Another Look at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The primary check on Board activity resides neither in the 
legislative, executive, or judicial branches, but in another independent 
agency which exercises legislative, executive, and judicial power: the 
SEC. Despite the widespread integration of independent agencies 
into the national system of government, the very notion of an agency 
that lies neither amongst the legislators nor the judges nor the 
President's Cabinet remains difficult to square with a tripartite 
governmental structure.333 With the PCAOB, moreover, its non-
agency within an independent agency stature renders it directly 
beholden only to a form of agency that is itself not directly beholden 
to the President. It is as if the Constitution created Beakers One to 
Three in our analogy but Congress unilaterally decided that the 
Constitution was incomplete. It therefore produced Beaker Four to 
ensure proper auditing of public companies subject to federal 
securities laws-despite the lack of constitutional "water" to fill it. 
Even if the creation of Beaker Four was justified as a matter of 
policy, it was not created to encompass the full power of the PCAOB. 
To be sure, in addition to affording it appointment and removal 
power, the Act broadly provides that the SEC "shall have oversight 
and enforcement authority over the Board,"334 including the power to 
modify or abrogate PCAOB rules,335 relieve the Board of its 
332. Accordingly, the APA's requirement that agencies give interested persons a right 
to petition for a new or amended rule, 5 U.S.c. § 553(e) (2006), as well as "[p]rompt notice 
... of the denial" of such a petition, id., and rights to judicial review, see 5 U.S.c. §§ 701, 
702, 706 (2006), do not constrain the PCAOB. 
333. See Carvin et aI., supra note 20, at 201. 
334. 15 U.S.c. § 7217(a) (2006). 
335. § 7217(b )(2)-(3) ("No rule of the Board shall become effective without prior 
approval of the Commission, [which] ... shall approve a proposed rule, if it finds that the 
rule is consistent with the requirements of this Act and the securities laws, or is necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."); see also 15 U.s.c. 
§ 7231 (2006) (amending the SEC Act to enable the Board to grant exemptions from 
various prohibitions on registered firms' ability to perform non-audit services 
contemporaneously with the audit of public companies, and subjecting the Board's 
exemption determinations to SEC review in the same manner as § 7217 provides for 
rules). Thus, the SEC must approve all PCAOB rules before they go into effect, a process 
which includes a second public notice and comment period as required by the SEC Act. 
See § 7217 (b)(4) ("The provisions of ... [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c. 
§ 78s(b) (2006))] shall govern the proposed rules of the Board, as fully as if the Board 
were a 'registered securities association' for purposes of that section 78s(b)."). The SEC 
can abrogate PCAOB rules, as well. See § 7217(b)(5) ("The provisions of section 78s(c) of 
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enforcement responsibilities entirely,336 and censure it for 
impropriety.337 If the PCAOB decides to impose sanctions following 
an investigation, it must report them to the SEC,338 which can affirm, 
modify, remand, set aside, or enhance the Board's sanction.339 
The SEC only narrowly reviews the PCAOB's ongoing 
inspection program, however. Parties can seek SEC review of the 
Board's "draft inspection reports,,,340 but there is no statutory 
provision enabling appeals of final inspection reports or authorizing 
SEC review of the conduct of the Board's inspections. Similarly, 
nothing in the Act enables parties to appeal the Board's decisions to 
initiate investigations.341 Yet the Board has the power to subpoena 
testimony or production of documents and revoke a firm's 
registration for refusals "to testify, produce documents, or otherwise 
cooperate with the Board in connection with an investigation.,,342 
The Act's shortcomings under a checks-and-balances approach, 
therefore, are twofold. First, it leaves certain activities of the PCAOB 
completely beyond review.343 The structure of the Constitution 
presupposes the existence of both political and judicial checks on the 
[the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c. § 78s(c»] shall govern the abrogation, 
deletion, or addition to portions of the rules of the Board by the Commission as fully as if 
the Board were a 'registered securities association' for purposes of that section 78c .... "). 
336. § 7217(d)(I). 
337. § 7217(d)(2). In particular, the SEC can impose limitations on the Board's 
activities if it finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the Board "has violated 
or is unable to comply with any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the 
securities laws" or "without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce 
compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by a registered 
public accounting firm or an associated person thereof." § 7217(d)(2)(A)-(B). The Act 
also specifies that the Board shall be treated as a "registered securities association" for 
purposes of SEC Act provisions which mandate recordkeeping by covered entities and 
allow SEC examinations of securities-related records and reports. § 7217(a) (citing 15 
U.S.c. § 78q(a)(I), (b)(I) (2006». 
338. 15 U.S.c. § 7215(d)(I)(A), 7217(c)(I) (2006). For purposes of the SEC's review, 
the Board is considered a "self-regulatory organization" governed by the SEC Act, which 
affords aggrieved parties basic guarantees of due process. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78s(d)(2), (e)(I). 
339. §§ 78s(e)(I), 7217(c)(3). 
340. 15 U.S.c. § 7214(h)(I)(A)-(B) (2006) ("A registered public accounting firm may 
seek review by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, pursuant to such rules as the 
Commission shall promulgate."). 
341. § 7215(a)-(b)(I). 
342. § 7215(b)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(3)(A). Although the Board may request documents and 
testimony from persons other than registered firms and their associates, it must go to the 
SEC for a subpoena if such parties are non-compliant. See § 7215(b)(2)(C)-(D). 
343. Peter Strauss notes that quasi-public institutions such as the NASD similarly 
control the initiation of disciplinary actions. Strauss, supra note 16, at 53. 
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exercise of power.344 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides neither. Even 
if the proper role of the President vis-a-vis agencies is merely "one of 
oversight rather than substitution of judgment,"345 the statute leaves 
the PCAOB beyond his reach. It embodies a movement of the 
national bureaucracy "beyond effective control, either by the people 
or by those whom the people directly select to head the government 
for them.,,346 Senator Gramm touched upon the problem with 
allowing the PCAOB to have such "massive power, unchecked 
power, by design"347: 
Its members are not elected officials. They are not appointed in 
the sense that they are not Government officials. They will have 
the ability to make decisions that will affect the livelihood of 
Americans who are in the accounting profession. They will 
literally have the ability to say to a CPA: We are taking your 
license away and you can never practice again in providing 
accounting services to a publicly traded company .... I think 
when you are taking people's livelihoods; they ought to have an 
opportunity to appeal to the Federal district court where they 
live. I think there ought to be a burden on them to make their 
case, and obviously the court is going to take into account that 
this board, that was duly constituted, made a decision. But I 
think that is an opportunity that people ought to have that they 
do not have under this bill.348 
344. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 
1691 (2004). 
345. Strauss, supra note 4, at 496. 
346. Id. at 490 (discussing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983), and N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982)). 
347. 148 CONGo REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
348. Id. at 14,442 (statement of Sen. Gramm). The legislative history of the Act reveals 
little discussion regarding the amenability of the PCAOB to judicial review and no 
discussion of the propriety of exempting the Board from the APA. Senator Phil Gramm 
(R-Texas) was the only member of Congress to comment on the issue of judicial review of 
the Board's decisions or, for that matter, on the overall powers of the Board. Senator 
Gramm notably remarked that the Board was to have "massive power, unchecked power, 
by design" that will enable it to "make decisions that affect all accountants and everybody 
they work for, which directly or indirectly is every breathing person in the country." Id. at 
12,119 (statement of Sen. Gramm). Despite their sound-byte appeal, these comments were 
aimed not at the desirability of the Board having such power, but at the question of who 
should be on a Board with such "tremendous, unbridled, unchecked power." He 
explained: 
We need to give some more thought to who is going to be on this board and is it 
going to be something that is attractive enough to make people want to serve .... I 
urge my colleagues, think long and hard when you think about this board exerting 
tremendous, unbridled, unchecked power, about how many people you want on 
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Short of Congress enabling judicial review, the issue Senator 
Gramm raises might be addressed by requiring the SEC to sign off on 
the PCAOB's investigative decisions. Such latter revisions to the Act, 
however, would leave in place a second problem. The notion that a 
fourth branch of government-here, the SEC-provides the needed 
checks and balances is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of 
powers. The Constitution establishes three branches of government. 
The SEC is not democratically elected,349 and Congress is 
constitutionally barred from removing Commissioners.35o Nor does 
the SEC fall within the judicial power of Article III. To the extent it is 
constitutionally viable, it is likely so because the President appoints 
and removes Commissioners for cause.35J In that way, it is arm of the 
executive branch.352 But the entire justification for finding the Act 
constitutional rests on SEC oversight-and distinctly not on 
presidential oversight. 
The Act does leave intact the President's ability to appoint SEC 
members and remove them for cause, the SEC's susceptibility to 
judicial review, and Congress's ability to exert influence over the SEC 
through its appropriations, investigatory, and legislative powers. This 
Article does not attempt to address as an empirical matter whether 
such constraints on SEC power operate to effectively constrain 
PCAOB power as well. It suggests, rather, that crowning the SEC as a 
pseudo-government "branch" that is responsible for checking 
PCAOB power is somewhat extraordinary under basic separations-
of-powers principles. If Congress is going to limit presidential 
appointment and removal power, it should consider retaining levers 
of oversight that originate in Articles I or III of the Constitution-
judicial review, statutory requirements for public disclosure, and 
financial control. 
Id. 
the board who know something about the subject matter. Today, in an 
environment where accountants are the evil people of the world, the enemies of 
the people, having no accountants on this board or relatively few and not letting 
them vote when ethics matters are being dealt with, I assert that kind of approach 
means you are not going to have first-rate people who are going to want to serve. 
349. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
350. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986) (holding that Congress may not 
retain the power to remove an officer exercising executive powers). 
351. See Miller, supra note 1, at 65 (concluding that since the Constitution specifies that 
there are three branches of government, independent agencies must be considered as part 
of the executive branch); see also Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 252-56 (disputing independence of independent 
agencies because chairmen are re-designated on an annual basis by the President). 
352. Miller, supra note 1, at 65. 
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One problem with a checks-and-balances approach to 
constraining the creation of novel independent agencies is that it 
attempts to elevate mechanisms of accountability that are entirely 
discretionary on Congress's part-such as judicial review and the 
appropriations power-and render them constitutionally mandatory. 
In that sense, it would be preferable to use the Appointments Clause 
because the Constitution binds Congress. This Article does not mean 
to suggest that a checks-and-balances approach is superior to one 
grounded in the Appointments Clause. The point is that the facts of 
Morrison largely foreclose such an analysis. As a result, the 
Appointments Clause is not a vibrant tool for cabining congressional 
overreaching in fashioning independence for agencies. And the Court 
is unlikely to touch its longstanding precedent under it. 
What is missing from prevailing doctrine governing the 
constitutionality of the Act, therefore, is an accounting of the myriad 
mechanisms for ensuring that policymaking, law-enforcing bodies are 
accountable to the public via the elected branches and to the rule of 
law via the courts. Judicial review would enable the PCAOB to be 
checked by the power set forth in Article III. Ongoing appropriations 
authority would put the PCAOB within the legislative power of 
Article I. Susceptibility to disclosure statutes would enable public 
access to the inner workings of the PCAOB which, in turn, can 
prompt congressional calls for investigation. All of these mechanisms 
for ensuring accountability are missing from the Act. The statutory 
dearth of these details falls under the radar. And there is no evident 
basis in existing case law for ensuring that a statute that lacks such 
mechanisms conforms to separation of powers norms. 
To be sure, the checks-and-balances approach proposed here is 
both incomplete and susceptible to the same line-drawing critique this 
Article lodges against the "core function" test.353 How to determine 
whether a statute contains sufficient mechanisms for accountability 
under the list compiled above is a question that warrants further 
research and analysis. The aim of this Article is not to propose and 
defend a self-contained answer to the conundrum of independent 
agencies. It is, rather, to begin a dialogue for responding to this 
problem within the Court's existing doctrine. As Peter McCutchen 
has suggested, given the entrenchment of independent agencies in our 
353. See Sargentich, supra note 28, at 459 (noting that the idea of checks and balances 
"does not answer all questions, for many involve doubts about the very nature of such a 
boundary" between the branches). Indeed, a key question in implementing a checks-and-
balances approach is "how much is too much, and by what measures are such things to be 
determined?" [d. at 440-41. 
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modern government, "a form of constitutional damage control" is 
what is called for at this point.354 Checks-and-balances scrutiny could, 
accordingly, "move governmental structures closer to the 
constitutional equilibrium" that has been disrupted by deficient 
preceden t. 355 
CONCLUSION 
The current economic crisis has shined a spotlight on the status 
of the modern administrative state. Skirmishes continue over the 
propriety of re-regulation after the catastrophic failures of de-
regulation.356 Finger-pointing abounds, as politicians and the public 
strive to identify responsible government and private actors. How 
best to regulate the regulators lies among these pressing issues. In this 
regard, this Article addresses whether there exists a meaningful 
constitutional standard for reviewing the propriety of increased 
independence for independent agencies. 
The independent agency, though oft-critiqued as beyond the 
purview of the three-branch system established by the framers in the 
Constitution, has become a cornerstone of American government. In 
a series of opinions over the last century, the Supreme Court has 
tailored constitutional doctrine under the Appointments Clause to 
uphold these institutions.357 The most recent case-Morrison v. 
Olson-stands undisturbed for nearly two decades. Congress's 
creation of the PCAOB after the collapse of Enron has reignited the 
debate over the constitutionality of novel agency forms. This is 
because, in establishing the Board, Congress eschewed the traditional 
independent agency model and fashioned the PCAOB to have 
"massive power, unchecked power, by design."358 The most glaring 
aspect of this design is that the SEC-and not the President-has the 
power to appoint and remove Board members and to oversee its 
operations.359 
354. Peter McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: 
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 1,6 (1994). 
355. [d. 
356. Compare Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation ll, 61 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 543, 556 (2009) ("[T]he demise of deregulation is now virtually guaranteed."), with 
Luca Enriques, Regulators' Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation 
of Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator'S View, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1147, 1155 
(2009) ("[E]xcessive reregulation today is the best guarantee of effective pressure towards 
deregulation tomorrow. "). 
357. See supra Part II. 
358. 148 CONGo REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
359. See supra Part I.B. 
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In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board, this new blueprint for the independent agency was challenged 
unsuccessfully in the D.C. Circuit, prompting the dissenting judge to 
charge the majority with giving Congress a "green light for all sorts of 
new creations, independent agencies within independent agencies."360 
Under prevailing law, Congress controls the extent to which the 
President has appointment and removal authority so long as it 
identifies within the administrative apparatus a person or entity-
other than the President-that has some supervisory, directory, or 
removal power over Board members. This formula for creating an 
"inferior officer" within the meaning of Article II fails to address the 
broader problem of a policymaking, law-enforcing entity that is 
effectively independent of any of the three branches of government. 
This is partly because the Court has bootstrapped its narrow 
"inferiority" analysis into the more expansive conclusion that 
limitations on the President's power to appoint and remove such 
officers does not interfere with core executive functions. In doing so, 
it has neglected to engage the threshold questions of the scope of 
executive power and what it means to unconstitutionally interfere 
with it. 
This Article suggests that the Court instead employ a segment of 
separation-of-powers theory-the need to ensure proper checks and 
balances amongst the three branches of government-in evaluating 
statutes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While the Act leaves the 
PCAOB substantially unrestrained by the President, the legislature, 
and the courts, the unelected, "independent" SEC is a dubious 
substitute for the coordinate branches established in the Constitution. 
This Article posits as a general approach that if Congress aims to 
insulate independent agencies from the President's direct power to 
appoint and remove officials in future legislation, it should retain 
traditional oversight mechanisms that are grounded in Articles I and 
III of the Constitution, such as judicial review, budget control, and 
susceptibility to government-in-the-sunshine laws. 
360. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 35. 
